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We are pleased to transmit the enclosed report by Paul Verkuil and Jeffrey Lubbers, titled
Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases. This year Social
Security’s disability programs will account for nearly five percent of the Federal budget, about
$100 billion. Nearly 10 million people depend upon them for benefits. They deserve the close
attention of policy makers and the public.
The current arrangements for handling disability claims and appeals are in dire need of
reform. As we stated in our January 2001 report, Charting the Future of Social Security’s
Disability Programs: The Need for Fundamental Change, Social Security’s multi-step disability
claims and appeals system is currently overwhelmed and in critical condition. The need for
reform will become even more acute as the baby boomers reach the age of increased likelihood of
disability and the number of applications grows substantially.
Over the last decade, the number of disability cases being appealed to the Federal district
courts has increased rapidly, from about 7,000 in 1991 to about 16,000 in 2001, and it is expected
to continue to grow. There are now more than 30,000 disability cases pending in the courts.
The report by Professors Verkuil and Lubbers was written under contract with the Board.
It analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of two major proposals for change that have been
made over the years: to create a new Article I Social Security Court with Article III review
limited to legal and constitutional issues, or, to maintain the current district court review structure
but centralize court of appeals review in a special Article III court (a Social Security Court of
Appeals). The authors conclude that, on balance, an Article I review structure would produce real
improvements in the system of administrative justice.
Professors Verkuil and Lubbers are distinguished scholars who have studied Social
Security’s disability determination process for many years. Their report is an informed and
thoughtful contribution to the broad discussion that needs to take place if comprehensive and
fundamental changes in the disability programs are to be made. Although the Board has taken no
definitive position at this time on the issues analyzed in this report, we strongly believe they
deserve urgent attention.
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Federal Administrative Judiciary, 1992 ACUS 771. See also Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal
Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV 1341 (1992) and Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal
Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate System for Performance Evaluation of ALJs, 7
A DMIN. L.J. A M U. 589 (1994).
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Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of
Social Security Disability Cases
A Report to the Social Security Advisory Board
By Paul Verkuil and Jeffrey Lubbers*
I. Introduction
This Report was commissioned by the Social Security Advisory Board
(“SSAB”). 4 Its goal is to evaluate various proposals for changes in the judicial review
structure relating to Social Security disability determinations. These proposals have
emanated from Congress, federal court advisory bodies, knowledgeable observers,
agency officials, and academics. SSA’s own Disability Advisory Committee in 1989
recommended that a study be done concerning “possible alternatives to the present
method of court review of Social Security cases.”5 At least two contrasting legislative
proposals have been pending for several years that span the range of realistic
possibilities: one would change the review structure after the ALJ stage by creating a
new Article I court structure (a Social Security Court) with Article III review limited to
legal and constitutional issues; another would maintain the current district court review
structure but centralize court of appeals review in a special Article III court (a Social
Security Court of Appeals).

*

The authors would like to thank Owen Kendler, Class of 2002, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
for his excellent research assistance, particularly with respect to the veterans claims appeals process.
4

Contract # SSA -REG-02-0026.
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REPORT OF THE DISABILITY A DVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY (July 25,
1989) 15, 19 (reiterating a recommendation it made in March 1988 that the Department of Justice prepare
such a study).

1

A. The Timeliness of This Report
While these alternatives are not themselves new, they have become increasingly
relevant in light of recent events. The number of disability claims is expected to rise in
the future for several reasons: (1) the impending retirement of Baby Boomers, 6 (2) the
downturn of the economy in the last two years, 7 (3) the resumption of continuing
disability reviews (“CDRs”) by the SSA, 8 and (4) the increasing tendency of private
insurance companies to require as a condition of payments that claimants pursue their
offsetting SSA disability benefits. 9 These caseload realities create pressure on the SSA to
achieve more uniform, fair, and efficient decisionmaking and will eventually add to the
caseload of the federal courts on judicial review. By the mid-1990s, several studies of
the federal judiciary had indicated that alternatives to the increasing federal caseload

6

See Statement of Stanford G. Ross, Chairman Social Security Advisory Board at the Tenth National
Educational Conference, Association of Administrative Law Judges (Oct. 3, 2001) (“SSA actuaries project
continued rapid growth as the baby boomers reach the greater likelihood of disability.”); SSAB, A GENDA
FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW CONGRESS AND THE NEW A DMINISTRATION, at 1, 2, 16
& 37 (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.ssab.gov/Overview1.pdf. Baby Boomers will begin to reach the
age of 65 in 2011 and finish reaching 65 in 2030. When they begin to retire in 2011, there will be 40.4
million seniors (or 13 percent of the population) and will grow to 70.3 million (20 percent of the
population) by 2030. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Projects Doubling of
Nation’s Population by 2100 (Jan. 13, 2000).
7

It is well known that while the disability program is not an employment scheme, applications rise when
the economy falters.
8

The SSA is currently in its seven-year CDR plan, commenced in 1996. The plan is part of the agency’s
response to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62. It calls for
increasing annual CDRs from 603,000 in 1997 to 1.7 million in 2002 with a peak year of 1.8 million in
2000. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SOCIAL SECURITY A DMINISTRATION, REPORT # A-01-9991002, AUDIT REPORT : PERFORMANCE MEASURE REVIEW: RELIABILITY OF THE DATA USED TO MEASURE
CONTINUING DISABILITY REVIEWS (June 2000), at A-5-A-6. Our report takes no position on revisions to
the CDR program.
9

Cf. D. Gregory Rogers, The Effects of Social Security Awards on Long-Term Disability Claims, 1 ATLA
A NNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE M ATERIALS 1117, 1117 (July 2001). Conversations with the SSAB
have also created a suspicion that private insurance policies are beginning to require appeals through the
ALJ stage before payment of insurance benefits, but the situation is too recent for data to have been
compiled.
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should be sought. 10 While the district court caseload only represents a small segment of
total SSA disability cases, it is a significant and growing portion of the federal courts’
civil case workload. 11
In addition, during the last decade, a possible model for Article I/Article III
shared review of disability cases has become reality with the emergence of a program for
review of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) disability claims. The presence of
an operating Article I disability court structure, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
makes it possible now to actually compare alternative disability review systems. 12
Finally, in 1994, Congress also made a significant structural change in the social security
program, by separating SSA from the Department of Health and Human Services to
“ensure that ‘policy errors resulting from inappropriate influence from outside the agency
such as those occurring in the early 1980s do not recur in the future.’”13 As a result, the
agency is now independent and better able to assist in a restructuring of the process.

10

See JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 33 (Dec.
1995); see also COMM. ON STRUCTURAL A LTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 65 (Oct.
1998); RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE A DMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1992), at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305877.html.
11

In the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, SSA disability cases constituted 4.6 percent of all federal
civil cases terminated through court action, while in the period ending March 31, 2001, SSA disability
cases constituted 6.0 percent of such cases. Compare ANNUAL REP . OF THE DIR., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1999 at Table C-4, 160-61 (1999) (reporting that 13,454 social security cases
terminated out of 228,190 terminated civil cases), at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/supps.html; with
A DMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTIC [SIC], Table C-4 (Mar. 31,
2001) (12,646 of 207,087 terminated civil cases), available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/caseload2001/tables/c04mar01.pdf.
12

Prior to 1988, VA disability decisions were unreviewable by statute: “[All decisions] shall be final and
conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to review by mandamus or otherwise any such decision.” Act of March 20, 1933, ch.3, § 5, 48
Stat. 8, 9 (repealed and superseded by Pub. L. No. 85-86, 71 Stat. 167) (cited by W ILLIAM F. FOX, THE
UNITED STATES BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS: THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE TO RECONCILE SPEED AND
JUSTICE DURING INTRA-A GENCY REVIEW 19 (2000)).
13

Statement by Rogelio Garcia, Congressional Research Service, House Subcommittee on Social Security,
pp. CRS-4-CRS-5 (July 25, 1996), quoting H. REP . No. 103-670, Social Security Administration Reform
Act of 1994, 103rd Cong. p. 90 (1994), as cited by A SS’N OF A DMIN. LAW JUDGES, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR T HE TRANSFER OF THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE
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For all these reasons, a study of judicial review alternatives is timely and
potentially more productive than it has been at any time in the recent past. While there
has not been any legislation introduced since 1995, this Report could well serve as an
analytical predicate to renewed congressional interest.
B. Organization of this Report.
This Report will proceed as follows: First, it analyzes the existing SSA disability
review structure with its strengths and weaknesses; next it analyzes various alternatives
for judicial review, along with an evaluation of the VA disability review structure;
finally, this Report compares the proposed alternatives against the existing SSA structure
and makes recommendations, where feasible. It concludes by suggesting areas for further
study.
It is important to note that this Report is primarily a study of the appeals process,
whether it be Article III or Article I based. The Report will not deal at length with the
administrative decision structure at SSA below the Appeals Council stage. It recognizes
that the greatest potential for meaningful reforms in the SSA process occur in the intake,
reconsideration, and hearing stages when the caseload is the highest. But our mandate is
to take the hearing caseload level as a given, and to describe alternatives in the final
stages of review—at the Appeals Council and judicial review level.

Accordingly,

A DJUDICATIONS OF SOCIAL SECURITY A CT CLAIMS FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION TO A
NEW INDEPENDENT REGULATORY A GENCY 5 (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.aalj.org/sepplan.html
[hereinafter REPORT ON NEW INDEPENDENT REGULATORY A GENCY ]. See also Statement of Ronald G.
Bernoski, President, Association of Administrative Law Judges Before the House Subcomm. on Social
Security, Comm. on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Social Security Disability Programs’ Challenges and
Opportunities (June 28, 2001), available at http://www.aalj.org/sepplan-statement.doc. The “inappropriate
influence” referred to includes the targeting of ALJs with high allowance rates for special review and
training during the Reagan Administration. The program was held to be improper (and then withdrawn by
SSA) after an ALJ organization challenged it in Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler,
594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C 1984). See Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations:

4

although the Report does explore the role of the administrative law judges as part of a
possible move to an Article I alternative court structure, many other important questions,
including the role of state deciders in the current process 14 and the need for better quality
assurance systems 15 will be left for further study. 16
It should be noted that, with respect to many of these questions, the authors urge
that the many recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS) be considered. ACUS undertook numerous studies relating to the appeals
process in the Social Security Administration (SSA) disability program. It issued four
recommendations specifically involving the various levels of review in that program. 17
In Recommendation 87-6, State-Level Determinations in Social Security Disability
Cases, ACUS addressed the first level of determination and review in the disability
program. The underlying study was based on early results from demonstration projects

Recommendations for Reform, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 497-502 (detailing SSA’s controversial practices
with respect to its ALJs).
14

See, e.g., GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY: SSA M UST HOLD ITSELF A CCOUNTABLE FOR
CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN DECISION-M AKING, GAO/HEHS-97-102 (Aug. 1997). See also REPORT OF
THE DISABILITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 2 at 17,
(urging changes in the DDS process).
15

See, e.g., THE LEWIN GROUP , PUGH ETTINGER M CCARTHY A SSOCIATES, & CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
EVALUATION OF SSA’S DISABILITY QUALITY A SSURANCE (QA) PROCESSES AND DEVELOPMENT OF QA
OPTIONS THAT W ILL SUPPORT THE LONG-TERM M ANAGEMENT OF THE DISABILITY PROGRAM, (Mar. 16,
2001).
16

This Report primarily covers cases involving disability under the Disability Insurance program (Title II
of the Social Security Act) and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program (Title XVI), which
accounts for 90 percent of the work of SSA’s Office of Hearings and Appeals. The remainder consists of
claims made under the Retirement and Survivors Insurance program (Title II), Medicare (Title XVIII), and
non-disability claims under the SSI program. See About SSA’s Office of Hearings and Appeals, available
at http://www.ssa.gov/oha/overview.htm. Appeals under Medicare Parts A and B constituted about 11% of
the hearing dispositions by SSA ALJs in FY 2000. See SOC . SEC. A DMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN,
A NNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 117, Table 2.F9 (2000). Because these Medicare cases are now being
heard under an agreement with the Department of HHS, we take no position on whether they should
necessarily be treated in the same way as disability cases, if our recommendations are followed.
17

These recommendations can be found at “Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the
United States,” available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/acustoc.html. Professor Verkuil
was a member of ACUS and Professor Lubbers was ACUS’s Research Director from 1982-95. ACUS’s
operations ceased in October 1995. See Symposium in 30 A RIZ. ST . L.J. 1-204 (1998).
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involving the state- level disability determination process. It recommended additional
experimentation with face-to- face hearings and interviews at this level.
Recommendation 78-2, Procedures for Determining Social Security Disability
Claims,18 primarily addressed the administrative law judge stage of the Social Security
disability program. It recommended the continued use of ALJs, and made suggestions
concerning the development of the evidentiary hearing record, including recommending
that ALJs take more care in questioning claimants, seek to collect as much evidence prior
to the hearing as possible, make greater use of prehearing interviews, and make better use
of treating physicians as sources of information. It also recommended closing of the
record at the ALJ stage and better development and dissemination of precedent materials
by the SSA.
Recommendation 87-7, A New Role for the Social Security Appeals Council,19
addressed the organization and function of the Appeals Council. ACUS suggested wideranging and substantial changes in the workings of the Appeals Council, including that it
move away from its historical primary function as a case review panel.

The

recommendation suggested that the caseload be significantly limited, and that the
Appeals Council focus on important issues on which it could issue precedential opinions.
In Recommendation 90-4, Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process:
Supplementary Recommendation,20 the Conference addressed the need to have the

18

43 Fed. Reg. 27,508 (June 26, 1978). This recommendation was based largely on JERRY L. MASHAW,
CHARLES L. GOETZ, FRANK I. GOODMAN, WARREN F. SCHWARTZ, PAUL R. VERKUIL & MILTON M.
CARROW , SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND A PPEALS (Lexington 1978) [hereinafter M ASHAW ET . AL.].
(This study was done through the National Center for Administration Justice, Milton Carrow, Director, and
was led by Professor Mashaw of the Yale Law School.)
19

52 Fed. Reg. 49,143 (Dec. 30,1987).

20

55 Fed. Reg. 34,213 (Aug. 22, 1990).

6

evidentiary record be as complete as possible as early in the process as possible. It
advocated an increased use of subpoenas to make this possible, and in conjunction with a
provision in an earlier Recommendation, that physicians asked to provide medical
information in disability proceedings be adequately compensated. 21 The Conference also
reiterated that the record before the ALJ should be closed at a set time after the hearing.
The recommended procedure would give the claimant sufficient time to acquire such
information as is needed to complete the record, and would also provide for extensions of
time upon a showing of good cause. As a corollary to this, the Conference urged that a
procedure be developed for the ALJ to reopen a record upon petition by the claimant
where there is new and material evidence relating to the period covered by the hearing. 22
II. Overview of the Current SSA Disability Review Structure
The current judicial review structure has been in place since the beginning of the
program. 23 In terms of administrative review, it is unique in its scope and workload. No

21

See ACUS Recommendation 89-10, Improved Use of Medical Personnel in Social Security Disability
Determinations, ¶5(c), 55 Fed. Reg. 34,212 (Aug. 22, 1990). This recommendation also urged enhanced
use of medical personnel at the initial decision level, better identification of conflicts over medical
evidence, and heavier reliance on medical experts at the ALJ stage. It also suggested that if these reforms
were instituted, the initial determination level should be a single step—with the elimination of the separate
reconsideration stage.
22

Such petitions could be filed within one year of the ALJ decision or while the case is pending before the
Appeals Council if it has been appealed. Under such a procedure, new evidence would be considered first
by the ALJ, thereby giving the adjudicator most familiar with the case the first opportunity to review new
evidence, potentially reducing the number of cases that would be presented to the Appeals Council, and
giving the Appeals Council more of an appellate role. Id.
23

Federal district court review of all Social Security decisions in which the Commissioner of Social
Security was a party has been available since the SSA was created in 1935. See 42 U.S.C. § 405, 42 Stat.
624 (Aug. 14, 1935). ALJs (formerly designated as hearing examiners) were used from the inception of the
DI program in 1956. Due to the mounting caseload, the Office of Hearings and Appeals was created in
1959. When the SSI program was federalized and added to the SSA in 1972, it used the existing SSA
disability appeals system. In cases involving termination of benefits, SSA’s practice was to offer only an
informal pre-termination hearing, followed by a formal post-termination hearing before an ALJ, see
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 346 (1976) (upholding this process against a due process challenge).
However, Congress provided for pre-termination ALJ hearings in 1983, see 42 U.S.C. § 423(g), added by
Pub. L. No. 97-455 (1983). See also SOC. SEC. ADMIN. ONLINE, DETAILED CHRONOLOGY , available at
http://www.ssa.gov /history/chrono.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2002) and Daniel J. Gifford, Federal

7

other program of the federal government produces such a large and complicated
caseload for the federal courts to review, and of course no other benefit program of the
federal government serves over 10 million beneficiaries or involves expenditures that will
top $100 billion in FY 2002. 24
A. The Role of the District Court
After the Social Security Administration signs off on a disability case, either as a
result of an ALJ decision or Appeals Council consideration, the losing claimant has an
opportunity to appeal to the federal district court. While traditionally known as a trial
court, the federal district court serves an appellate function in SSA disability review. In
this role, it is called upon not to hear matters in a trial de novo as it traditionally does, 25
but to apply the substantial evidence standard to the record before it. 26 Over the years,
substantial evidence reviews of disability cases by district courts (and even subsequent
review of such decisions by courts of appeals) have remained a heavily contested
matter. 27
This modification of the role of district courts is made necessary because of the
size of the disability caseload, which makes the usual practice of direct review of formal

Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices to Future Directions, 49 A DMIN. L. REV. 1, 1419 (1997) (providing a concise history of the SSA appeals legislation).
24

SSAB, CHARTING THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY’S DISABILITY SYSTEM: THE NEED FOR
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 1 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter SSAB, CHARTING THE FUTURE ], at http://www.ssab.gov
/disabilitywhitepap.pdf.
25

The district courts do hear other miscellaneous appeals from agencies because, under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the venue for judicial review of agency action is controlled by the underlying programmatic
statute. If the statute is silent on the matter, judicial review is only available through a suit for injunctive or
declaratory relief in the appropriate district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 703.
26

See 42 U.S.C. § 405g (commonly referred to as Social Security Act § 205(g)), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title02/0205.htm.
27

See, e.g., Davis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 670, 675-76 (8th Cir. 1997) (Beezer, J. dissenting) (stating that the
ALJ’s denial of benefits was clearly supported by substantial evidence).
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administrative adjudication in the courts of appeals manifestly impractical. 28

For

example, during the decade 1990 to 2000, the number of new disability cases in the
federal courts nearly tripled from 5,000 to 15,000, 29 while during this period the disability
caseload in the courts of appeals varied far less greatly, going from 992 appeals in 1988 30
to 754 appeals in 2001. 31 In terms of impact upon the court system, during the one-year
period ending September 30, 2000, Social Security cases represented 5.86 percent of all
civil district court cases, but only 2.5 percent of all civil cases in the courts of appeals. 32
But if one assumed that disability cases went directly to the courts of appeals during this
period, they would have represented a backbreaking 19.6 percent of the appeals courts’
civil caseload. 33
Federal district courts play a significant symbolic role as well as a corrective one
in our judicial system. For social security disability claimants, access to the federal
courts helps to legitimate their claims. As an earlier study of the SSA disability system
observed, review by a judge of broad competence guarantees a fresh and independent
28

See M ASHAW ET AL., supra note 15 at 125. Most statutes establishing formal agency adjudicative
programs specify that judicial review is by the courts of appeals because a trial-type hearing has already
been held before an agency adjudicator, and review is to be had on the basis of the administrative record
below. However, due to the high volume of SSA disability cases, review is placed in the district court in
the first instance. See generally David Currie & Frank Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal
Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. (1975).
29

See SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: DATA AND M ATERIALS 84
(Jan. 2001) [hereinafter SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING]; A NNUAL REP . OF THE DIR., JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2000 [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000] at Table S-17 (2000)
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/contents.html (displaying data for 1990 and 1996 through
2000).
30

REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL , U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS: REPORT 1988 at Table B1-A (1988) [hereinafter REPORT 1988].
31

See A NNUAL REP . OF THE DIR., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2001 at Table B-7
(2001) (displaying data for the twelve month period ending March 31, 2001) [hereinafter JUDICIAL
BUSINESS 2001].
32

See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 26, at Tables B1-A & C-4 (2000), (942 of 37,336 civil
terminations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000).
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look at the disability decision process. 34

Federal courts are in principle the best

assurance we have that a citizen will be treated fairly.
But over the years the theoretical advantage of judicial oversight has become
more limited in practice. District judges increasingly review disability cases not by
themselves, but through established surrogates: magistrate judges take evidence, decide
on summary judgment, or remand to the agency. 35 In FY 1999, magistrates decided over
40 percent of disability cases. 36
While the use of magistrate judges is well accepted in this and other contexts,
they are in fact Article I rather than Article III deciders. 37 They are often called upon to
perform routine matters (like overseeing discovery disputes) or to make decisions in
situations with repetitive fact patterns, like SSA disability cases. They are in effect
administrative deciders within the Article III system.

33

See id. at Tables B1 & C-4.

34

See M ASHAW ET AL. supra note 15, at 139.

Indeed, in terms of selection

35

Technically, the magistrate recommends a course of action to the district judge and the district judge has
discretion as to whether to sign and enter the decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Magistrate judges
hear SSA matters under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The statute allows a district judge to assign cases to
magistrate judges to conduct hearings and to submit to the judge proposed findings of fact and a
recommendation for the disposition in the case. Any party has ten days to ask the judge to review the
magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo. The recommendations may accept, reject or
modify the magistrate judge’s report in whole or in part.
36

Magistrate judges disposed of 6,132 social security cases in FY 1999 and 5,516 in FY 2000. This is out
of a total of 15,537 social security terminations in FY 1999 (39.4 percent) and 14,731 in FY 2000 (37.4
percent). This is down from 54.6 percent in 1988. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 26,Table S-17,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/tables/s17sep00.pdf.; A NNUAL REPORTS for 1999 and
2000 supra note 26, Table C-4; REPORT 1988, supra note 27, at Table C-4.
37

It may be more apt to identify U.S. Magistrate Judges as “Title 28 Judges.” While they are agents of
Article III judiciary, magistrate judges are not themselves Article III judges. Congress has authorized the
Judicial Conference of the United States to determine the salary and number of magistrate judges in each
district. A magistrate judge’s salary can be no more than 92 percent of a district courts judge’s salary.
Once the required number is established, each of the 97 federal districts hire magistrate judges by a
majority vote of the judges in the district. Full-time magistrate judges serve eight-year terms and can be
rehired for addit ional terms until the age of seventy. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633, 634, 636, 637; see also
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682-83 & n.11 (1980) (analogizing magistrate judges to special
masters and distinguishing them from Article III judges).
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criteria and experience, magistrates are not that far removed from ALJs, 38 and there are
not many functional differences between the two corps of administrative deciders. Since
the district court applies the substantial evidence test, SSA cases rarely go to trial. In
2001, only 0.25 percent of disability cases reached oral arguments in district court, 39
which is about the same as the 0.31 percent in 1988. 40
In applying the substantial evidence test, district courts are in theory bound to
affirm an agency’s findings of facts if there is some support in the record for the agency’s
position. Under the familiar APA standard, substantial evidence is defined as more than
a “scintilla,” which must be found after consideration of the whole record. 41

This

standard is meant to be very deferential, 42 although ALJ decisions on witness and
physician credibility remain part of the equation.

38

If anything, the qualifications and protections for ALJs are stronger than for magistrate judges.
Magistrate judges are appointed for a term of eight years while ALJs do not have a term. Magistrate judges
must be a member in good standing of the bar for five years to be eligible; ALJs for seven years.
Magistrate judges are appointed by district court merit selection panels, composed of residents of the
individual judicial districts; ALJs are appointed by agencies off a list of qualified eligible applicants after
an examination by the Office of Personnel Management. Removal of magistrate judges by the judges
during the term of office must be only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental
disability. ALJs may be disciplined or remo ved only for “good cause” demonstrated before the Merit
Systems Protection Board. See 28 USCA § 631 (magistrate judges) and 5 U.S.C. § 7521; 5 CFR §
930.203a;
and
“USA
Jobs:
Administrative
Law
Judges,”
available
at
http://www.usajobs.opm.gov/EI28.htm (ALJs).
39

See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2001 supra note 28, at Table C-4. This is one tenth of the percentage of all civil
cases (2.3 percent) that went to trial before district courts in 2001. See id.
40

See REPORT 1988 supra note 27, at Table C-4.

41

See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling &
Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do more
than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established.”). Another oft-quoted Supreme Court
formulation is “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See ERNEST GELLHORN AND RONALD M.
LEVIN, A DMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 92 (4TH ED . 1997). In a subsequent case
involving the SSA disability process, the Court made it clear that even evidence that would be inadmissible
in court and was not subject to cross-examination before an ALJ could constitute substantial evidence.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
42

See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE , A DMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2 (1994).
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But deference is not what the statistics show in SSA cases. District courts have
long reversed and remanded disability cases on a greater than 50 percent basis, 43 although
these rates vary greatly among judicial districts. 44

It is difficult to know what this

reversal/remand rate (which instead approximates what one might expect under a de novo
review system) actually reflects. 45 In one respect, it shows that district court judges (and
magistrates) are skeptical if not antagonistic to the quality of the underlying SSA decision
process, which may be due to factors that are no longer compelling. 46 But it may also be
the result of an unusual statutory relationship with the agency itself.
The “good cause” remand function (under section 205(g) 47 ) gives the district
court an opportunity to exercise policy control. The remand provision places the district
courts “not in the accustomed role as external overseers of the administrative process . . .
but virtually as co-participants in the process . . . .”48 In effect, this unique standard
allows (perhaps even encourages) the district courts, or their magistrate judges, to send
cases back almost reflexively. Since the likelihood is that on remand the agency will

43

See infra, Section V (note 113 and accompanying text).

44

See infra, Appendix A (showing variations in reversal rates by judicial district with significant numbers
of SSA disability cases, from 2.3 percent in the Eastern District of Kentucky to 53.8% in the Southern
District of New York of judgments on the merits).
45

See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards (forthcoming 2002).

46

See id. at 37 (discussing reactions of the courts to the controversial congressionally mandated
(“Bellmon”) review program which removed claimants from the disability rolls in the 1980s); see also
REPORT ON NEW INDEPENDENT REGULATORY A GENCY, supra note 10.
47

Social Security Act § 205(g) provides in relevant part:
(g) . . . The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, . . . . The court may, on motion of the
Commissioner of Social Security made for good cause shown before the Commissioner
files the Commissioner’s answer, remand the case to the Commissioner of Social
Security for further action by the Commissioner of Social Security . . . . 42 U.S.C. 405(g).

48

See M ASHAW ET AL. ET AL ., supra note 15, at 133.
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enter judgment in the claimant’s favor, 49 this decision of the court often becomes
outcome determinative. Given this ease of remand, one would think, the present system
of judicial review has incentives built- in to resolve matters quickly and without a large
investment of district court time. Yet, the average time SSA cases sit before the district
court is a non-expeditious twelve to eighteen months. 50
B. Established Critiques of the Present System
When the judicial phase was looked at in depth twenty- five years ago, several
suggestions were made to improve the process. First, it was suggested that the record
should be closed after the ALJ stage; and, second, that the good cause remand option
under Section 205(g) be eliminated. 51 The purpose of these relatively modest changes
was to fix responsibility: “if there is ever to be agreement on whether anyone in the
whole multi- tier process of disability claims adjudication has ever committed an error,
there must be one locus of responsibility for developing a record and review of that
record.”52

49

Remands to the Appeals Council result in grants over 60 percent of the time. See SSAB, CHARTING THE
FUTURE , supra note 21, at 14.
50

Compare id. at 7 with Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form:
Federal District-Court Civil Case (providing a dataset that reveals an average time of 357 days in FY 2000,
up from 256 days in FY 1990), at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questcv3.htm. Statistics on time for
remands versus reversals and affirmances have not been recorded. The SSAB reports that it takes about
one year for a claim to be processed at the ALJ level. This compares favorably to the approximately 505
days in 2001 to process an appeal by the Appeals Council. The average time to process a claim at the
Appeals Process has been on a steady rise since the mid-1990s when it took just over 100 days for
processing in 1994. See SOCIAL SECURITY A DVISORY BOARD, STATEMENT ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL
SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM, (September 2001), at 7-8; SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra note
26, at 78 (Chart 60).
51

M ASHAW ET AL. supra note 15, at 103, 126, 134-36. Congress would of course have to amend § 205(g)
in this regard.
52

M ASHAW ET AL. supra note 15, at 136 (emphasis in original).
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These changes were never implemented, but they are still worthy of
consideration. 53 One virtue of a closed record would be to enhance the precedential
impact of district courts review on the agency since the open file practice undermines
attempts to follow a case to its conclusion. Furthermore, while the open file practice may
have made some sense in an era where there was little legal assistance to work up the
case at the administrative stage, today most claimants are represented by attorneys 54 who
can be responsible for that task. Today it seems that smart counsel for claimants are in
effect encouraged to “game” the system by holding back key pieces of data (medical
records, etc.) in order to gain remands at the judicial review phase. 55 This tactic may
delay the process unnecessarily (and may cost the claimant not only valuable time but
higher attorney’s fees as well). 56
The 1978 study took no position on whether an Article I court alternative would
be preferable to the present system for review, except to emphasize that such a body, if

53

See ACUS Recommendation 90-4 (4):
4. Closing of the Administrative Record: The administrative hearing record should be
closed at a set time after the evidentiary hearing. Prior to this, the ALJ should set forth for
the claimant what information the claimant needs to produce to complete the record, issue
any necessary subpoenas, and provide the claimant adequate time to acquire the
information. Requests for extension should be granted for good cause, including
difficulty in obtaining material evidence from third parties. The ALJ should retain the
discretion to accept and consider pertinent information received after closure of the
record and before the decision is issued.

Recommendation 90-4, Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process: Supplementary
Recommendation, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305904.html. See also REPORT
OF THE DISABILITY A DVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 2 at
12-13, 18, (urging closure of the record at the end of the ALJ stage).
54

About 70 percent of claimants are represented before ALJs. See SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION M AKING,
supra note 26, at 73 (Chart 56). These attorneys are paid approximately $500 million annually in attorney
fees by SSA. See SSAB, HOW SOCIAL SECURITY’S DISABILITY PROGRAMS CAN BE IMPROVED (Aug 1998)
25 (citing payments of $490 million in FY 1997).
55

SSAB, A GENDA FOR SOCIAL SECURITY supra note 3, at 13.

56

Attorneys are paid a percentage of the claimant’s retroactive benefits, which grow as the case moves
through the system.
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created, must decide matters in a timely, independent, and professional manner. 57 In the
intervening years, much has happened, including the newly independ ent status of the
SSA itself, and the case for a new approach to judicial review—or at least for renewed
justification of the existing structure—is surely stronger than ever. It is to the subject of
specialized courts (both Article I and Article III) that we turn next.
III. Some History With Respect to Proposals for Specialized Courts
Although the United States has largely turned to the generalist Article III district
and circuit courts of appeals as the forums for judicial review of administrative agency
action, there has been occasional reliance on specialized courts of review. 58
A. Established Specialized Courts
One of the first such courts was the Court of Claims created in 1855 to decide
monetary claims against the United States that previously had to be decided by
Congress. 59 It later evolved into an appellate forum, reviewing the decisions of
Commissioners it appointed regarding contract and other non-tort claims under the
Tucker Act. In 1982, however, Congress gave its appellate functions to the new Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and created a new Article I trial court, the United States
Claims Court. 60 In 1992, the trial court’s name was changed to the United States Court of

57

See M ASHAW ET AL . supra note 15, at 146-50. A more recent study has come down on the side of an
Article I court structure. See Levy, supra note 10, at 461.
58

For good overviews see, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L.
REV. 329 (1991); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 B.Y.U. L. RE V. 377; and
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111
(1990).
59

The Supreme Court held it to be an Article I court in Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561
(1964) and again in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). After Congress declared it to be an
Article III court, the Supreme Court so held in Glidden v. Zdanok , 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
60

See Bruff, supra, note 55 at 332-333. The judges of the Court of Federal Claims can be removed only for
cause and with the concurrence of a majority of the judges of the Federal Circuit. See FED. COURTS STUDY
COMM., W ORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990) (Vol. I) 170 n. 27.
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Federal Claims. 61

It now has sixteen judges who serve fifteen- year terms.

Its

headquarters is in Washington, DC, but cases are heard in other locations convenient to
the parties. 62
Another such court was the Court of Customs Appeals, created in 1909 to hear
appeals from the Board of General Appraisers which had been created in 1890 to
adjudicate various customs disputes. The Board’s name was changed to the United States
Customs Court in 1926 and it became an Article III court in 1956. Meanwhile the Court
of Customs Appeals became the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) in 1929
when Congress added jurisdiction over appeals from the Commissioner of Patents which
had previously been heard by the D.C. Circuit. In 1980, the CCPA was also given
appellate authority over a new Article III court, the Court of International Trade, which
subsumed the Customs Court and also was given jurisdiction over international trade
cases that theretofore had been heard in the district courts. 63
Finally in 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) was
created as the only non-geographic circuit court of appeals. 64 It was created as an Article
III court and given jurisdiction of the former CCPA, (customs, trade and patent cases)
plus a potpourri of other appeals: appeals from the Claims Court, the International Trade
Commission, the Merit Systems Protection Board, Boards of Contract Appeals, and a few

61

See Federal Court Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992).

62

See http://www.uscourts.gov/understanding_courts/89921.htm.

63

See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990) (Vol.
I) 170-74, 189-92.
64

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“DC Circuit”) also has some specialized
jurisdiction, due to exclusive venue provisions in certain regulatory areas. Its members may also be
appointed without regard to residence. However, in general it acts like an ordinary regional court of
appeals.
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other agency and district court decisions. 65

In 1988, the CAFC also acquired

jurisdiction of appeals involving legal questions from the newly created Court of
Veterans Appeals (now named the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims). The CAFC
sits in Washington, DC, but may convene anywhere in the United States.
The other specialized courts that now exist 66 are Article I courts. They are labeled
Article I rather than Article III principally because their judges do not have life tenure
under the Constitution. 67 The Tax Court began in 1924 as the Board of Tax Appeals —a
quasi independent entity of the Treasury Department. In 1969, it was reshaped into an
Article I Tax Court. 68 It currently has nineteen judges who serve fifteen-year terms plus
seventeen special trial judges appointed by the Chief Judge. 69

Although the district

courts continue to hear some cases where taxpayers have paid the tax and then seek a
refund, the Tax Court hears 90 percent of the appeals from the Internal Revenue Service.
Its headquarters is in Washington, DC, but it hears cases in approximately eighty cities.
Appeals from the Tax Court go to the regional circuit courts. 70
The Court of Veterans Appeals (referred in Part I and described more fully in Part
VII(A)(3)) was created in 1988 to provide, for the first time, judicial review in veterans’
benefits cases decided by the Veterans Administration (now the Department of Veterans
65

It was created based on the report of the Hruska Commission, which also recommended a National Court
of Appeals. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM ., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1,
1990) (Vol. I) 192.
66

From 1910-1913, a short-lived Commerce Court was created to review decisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Its narrow jurisdiction and charges of capture led to its early dissolution. See id.
at 174-76;
67

There are some independent boards and commissions that function in a fashion similar to Article I courts
(such as the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission), but they will not be discussed here.
68

See Claudia MacLachlan, The Tax Bench: A Code Apart, 16 NAT ’L L. J. No. 4, p.1 (Sept. 27, 1993).

69

See http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/ustcweb.htm.
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Affairs). 71 The court (renamed the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 199872 )
hears decisions made by the Department’s presidentially appointed, administrative Board
of Veterans Appeals; further appeals, on matters of law only, may be taken to the CAFC.
The operation of this court is more fully described in Part VII of this Report.
The Article I U.S. Court of Military Appeals was created by Congress in 1950
when Congress also enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which established a
military judicial system. 73 This system was designed to give members of the military
services, who are accused of crimes, rights paralleling those of civilians. In 1994, the
name of the court was changed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The
court’s jurisdiction encompasses questions of law arising from trials by court- martial in
the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in cases where
a death sentence is imposed, where a case is certified for review by the Judge Advocate
General of the relevant service, or where an accused, facing a severe sentence, petitions
and shows good cause for further review. The five judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces are civilians appointed for fifteen-year terms by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The chief judge serves for five years and is
succeeded by the next senior judge on the court. The court is located in Washington,
D.C.
In addition to Article I Courts, there are two groups of Article I judges attached to
the U.S. District Courts: magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges.
70

Taxpayers may also seek refunds in the Claims Court—but appeals from that court go to the CAFC.

71

Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, §301, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113 (1988).

72

Its name was changed effective March 1, 1999, by the Ve terans’ Programs Enhancement Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-368.
73

The information about the court is from its website, http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov.

18

Magistrate judges are appointed by majority vote of the active district judges of
the court to exercise jurisdiction over matters assigned by statute as well as those
delegated by the distric t judges. 74

The number of magistrate judge positions is

determined by the Judicial Conference of the United States, based on recommendations
of the respective district courts, the judicial councils of the circuits, and the Director of
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. A full-time magistrate judge serves a term
of eight years. Duties assigned to magistrate judges by district court judges may vary
considerably from court to court, and as we have seen, they play a central role in the
disposition of SSA disability cases. At present, there are 471 full-time and 59 part-time
magistrate judges. 75
Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the majority of judges of each U.S. circuit to
exercise jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters.

The number of bankruptcy judges is

determined by Congress based on recommendations of the Judicial Conference of the
United States. Bankruptcy judges are appointed for fourteen-year terms. As of the end
of 2001, there were 324 authorized bankruptcy judgeship positions. 76
Decisions of both magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges are subject to review
by the supervising district court judge, though an interesting aspect of the bankruptcy
judge structure is that a statute provides that the circuit court may create a “bankruptcy
appellate panel service” composed of bankruptcy judges of the districts in the circuit to

74

See generally Leslie G. Foschio, A History of the Development of the Office of United States
Commissioner and Magistrate Judge System, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4, available at
http://www.fclr.org/1999fedctslrev4.htm.
75

See website for the Federal Magistrate Judges Association, available at http://www.fedjudge.org.

76

See “Cars, Planes-and Video Cameras-Take Bankruptcy Judges to Outlying Locations,” available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/bkjtravel.html.
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hear appeals from individual bankruptcy judge decisions. 77 Appeals heard under this
process are heard by a panel of three members of the bankruptcy appellate panel service,
except that a member of such service may not hear an appeal originating in the district for
which such member is appointed or designated. 78 In addition, such a procedure must be
authorized by a majority of the district court judges of the district. 79
Bankruptcy Appellate Panels provide an example of a two-tier process, using the
same pool of adjudicators. The Association of [SSA] ALJs has proposed that the SSA
ALJ corps be reconstituted into a two tier stage, modeled on the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panels, and that this stage be the final agency decision. 80 The ALJs’ report argues that
since 1.3 million cases are filed with the first level bankruptcy courts, and that 500,000
cases are filed with SSA ALJs, lessons should be drawn from the bankruptcy system.
The report also argues that bankruptcy practitioners believe that panel decisions produce
better products, 81 that in circuits with such panels, there are far fewer appeals to the court
of appeals, 82 that bankruptcy panels produce decisions in a very short time, 83 and that the
potential for service on such panels improves judicial morale. 84 While the SSA ALJ
study’s conclusions on this point have not been reviewed thoroughly, this is a proposal

77

28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). See Tisha Morris, Establishment of Bankruptcy Panels Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994: Historical Background and Sixth Circuit Analysis, 26 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1501
(1996) and Thomas E. Carlson, The Case for Bankruptcy Appeals Panels, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 575
(finding the panels to be “an unqualified success).
78

28 U.S.C § 158(b)(1)(5).

79

28 U.S.C § 158(b)(1)(6).

80

REPORT ON NEW INDEPENDENT REGULATORY A GENCY , supra note 10, at 40-43.

81

Id. at 42, citing Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., The Case Against Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 4 GEO.
M ASON. L. RE V. 1, 7 (1995).
82

Id. at 42, citing Morris, supra note 74, at 1517-19.

83

Id. at 42, citing Morris, supra note 74, at 1530 (giving the average disposition time of 75 days).

84

Id. at 43, citing Morris, supra note 74, at 1509.
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worth considering given the current extensive delays at, and limited policy review by,
the Appeals Council.
B. Other Recent Proposals for Specialized Courts Relating to Social Security85
In 1971, the “Ash Council” 86 recommended the creation of a specialized appellate
court to hear appeals from restructured transportation, power, and securities agencies.
85

It should be noted that there have also been several specialized courts made up of sitting judges. These
include two “emergency” courts. The Emergency Court of Appeals (“ECA”) was created in 1942 to handle
appeals from the wartime price administrators. The court was staffed by sitting federal judges from
throughout the nation appointed by the Chief Justice. Its constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme
Court in 1944 in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 437-38. It stayed in existence until 1961 to handle
appeals from various post-war and Korean War related programs. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM.,
W ORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990) (Vol. I) 176-81. In 1971, economic
conditions led to similar wage and price controls and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals was
created. It is also composed of sitting judges and its size has varied over the years (e.g., 20 in 1982 and 12
in 1989). See id. at 182. A few years later it was given jurisdiction over reviews of energy program
disputes. The court was dissolved in 1993 at the request of the Judicial Conference. Another temporary
highly specialized court consisting of sitting judges was created in 1973—the Special Court created by the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973. The court was set up to adjudicate consolidated claims
stemming from the railroad reorganization that led to the creation of Conrail. See id. 185-86.
In 1978 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act created a special court made up of seven sitting district
court judges from different circuits, appointed by the Chief Justice to hear applications for and to grant
orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States. There is also a three-judge
appeals court made up of sitting district or appeals judges to which denials of wiretap orders may be
appealed, with certiorari review (under seal) to the Supreme Court. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803. According to
one critic of the court, as of November 2000, it received 7,539 applications to authorize electronic
surveillance within the United States from the Justice Department on behalf of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the National Security Agency. In the name of national security, the court has approved
all but one of these requests. Each of these decisions was reached in secret, with no published orders,
opinions, or public record. See Philip Colangelo, The Secret FISA Court: Rubber Stamping Our Rights,
COVERT A CTION Q. (Nov. 27, 2000), available at http://www.rense.com/general5/fisacourt.htm. The two
courts are known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM.,
W ORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990) (Vol. I) 187-89.
In 1996 an Alien Terrorist Removal Court was created pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-132. This court, which is made up of five sitting district court judges
from different circuits, appointed by the Chief Justice, conducts proceedings based on applications brought
by the Attorney General to determine whether an alien should be removed from the United States on
grounds of being a terrorist.
Also, the 1978 Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521 § 602 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 49)
(establishing special division of the DC Circuit to appoint special prosecutor; amended to substitute term
“independent counsel” in 1983) created a special Court of Appeals “Division to Appoint Independent
Counsels.” 28 U.S.C § 49. The statute specified that one of the three shall be a member of the DC Circuit
and that not more than one judge or justice or senior or retired judge or justice may be named to such
division from a particular court. See id. Under this statute, three judges or justices were assigned for twoyear periods to a division of the United States Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit for the purpose of
appointing independent counsels. This division ceased to exist with the non-renewal of the Independent
Counsel statute.
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The Administrative Conference of the U.S. issued a statement in 1971 opposing this
particular proposal on a number of grounds that might be relevant here, though SSA
decisions are not the same sort of regulatory decisions. 87 Such concerns include the
benefits of having generalist judges provide scrutiny of agency action as to its fairness
and consistency with statutory norms, the danger that a narrowly specialized reviewing
court might become or appear to become identified with the agency, and the risk that the
appointments to such a court would pose a problem of adequate public oversight. 88
In 1977, the tenor of the debate about the need for specialized courts changed
with the publication of “The Needs of the Federal Courts” by the Department of Justice
Committee on Revision of the Federal Judicial System, chaired by Robert Bork. The
“Bork Report” identified a crisis of case volume in the district courts and urged the
creation of new non-Article III tribunals in the district courts to handle certain types of
cases characterized by relatively unsophisticated, repetitious factual issues that rarely
give rise to important legal questions. Among these were social security cases. 89
The ABA House of Delegates in August 1982 opposed creation of an Article I
Social Security Court for the reasons described in Part V of this Report. This resolution
was sponsored by the ABA’s Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly and
86

THE PRESIDENT ’S A DVISORY COUNCIL ON EXEC. ORG., A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON
SELECTED REGULATORY A GENCIES (1971) (chaired by businessman Roy L. Ash). See Nathaniel L.
Nathanson, The Administrative Court Proposal, 57 VA. L. RE V. 996 (1971).
87

ACUS, Statement 1, Views of the Administrative Conference on the “Report on Selected Independent
Regulatory Agencies” of the President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,974
(July 23, 1973).
88

See also the ACUS-sponsored article, David Currie & Frank Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal
Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 62-88 (1975) (critiquing
proposals for specialized courts).
89

After listing examples of these types of cases, the Committee stated, “These matters have great individual
and social significance but the questions they raise could be handled as effectively and justly by trained
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Commission on the Mentally Disabled. 90 In 1989, the Sloan Foundation commissioned
a review of the SSA appeals process that, among other things, strongly recommended the
creation of a Social Security Court. 91 The report recommended that the new court be an
Article III court, and that appeals from the court go to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
In 1990, another thorough study of the SSA appeals process, by Professor Richard
Levy, recommended the creation of an Article I “Court of Disability Appeals” (created by
expanding the jurisdiction of the then- named Court of Veterans Appeals) which would
substitute for the review responsibilities of both the Appeals Council (which would be
assigned policymaking functions) and the district courts. Appeals from the disability
court would mirror those from the veterans court, in that they would be limited to legal
questions. The administrative law judge corps would be made independent of the SSA as
well. Under Professor Levy’s proposal, the SSA would be entitled to seek review in the
disability court. 92
Also in that same year, a special Federal Courts Study Committee, undertook a
comprehensive study of the entire federal judiciary. The Committee, consisting of a
select panel of fifteen federal judges, Members of Congress and distinguished lawyers,
formally recommended that:

administrative judges as by Article III judges burdened with the pressing business of a general criminal and
civil jurisdiction.” Report at page 9.
90

Proposed resolution on file with authors.
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levels of adjudication, I believe recommending the creation of a Social Security Court is the most clear cut
and easiest to make.”)
92

See Levy, supra note 10 at 512-37.

23

Congress should create a new structure for adjudicating disability claims under
the Social Security Act: hearings before administrative law judges with
adequate institutional independence, whose decisions could be appealed to
a new Article I Court of Disability Claims, with review in the courts of
appeal limited to constitutional claims and to pure issues of law. 93
This report concluded that:

“[t]he principal issues in most Social Security

disability cases are factual and technical. Thus it is best to concentrate adjudicative
resources at the administrative level and create a new appellate court that will attract
competent specialists in disability law.”94
It also stated its belief that the new court “will provide a more thorough and
expert examination of facts than federal district court can provide, given the other
demands on their time.”95

It also suggested that Congress may wish to consider

expanding the jurisdiction of such a court to include claims now handled by the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims—which it said might provide a good model for the
proposed new Court of Disability Appeals. It concluded that “[t]he enhanced authority
and prestige of such a court would attract the ablest specialists in the field of disability
law, and the broader the court’s jurisdiction, the more it will alleviate the Article III
judiciary’s disability caseload.”96 As for the Appeals Council, which would lose its
appellate adjudicative responsibilities under the proposal, the Committee suggested it be
reconstituted “as an agency to promulgate the regulations that guide the adjudication of
Social Security disability cases” in the manner that the Occupational Safety and Health
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Id. at 57.
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Administration does for the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC). 97
Most recently the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals, chaired by Justice Byron White in December 1998 issued a report that said
Congress should seriously consider proposals for an Article I Social Security Court,
perhaps with exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the CAFC on the same basis as for
veterans’ appeals—review limited to constitutional and statutory questions. 98

IV. Proponents’ Arguments for a Social Security Court
As discussed above, proponents have cited relief for the Article III district courts
as well as benefits for the social security adjudication process itself. The Bork Report
pointed to the dramatic increase in federal district court filings of social security cases
and argued that this has significantly added to the overall backlog in district courts (and
presumably in the courts of appeals). Proponents also argue that disability filings have
created painful delays in resolution of claims by district courts since these cases must
compete with all the other civil and criminal business in the federal courts.
Another alleged problem is that of non-uniformity, which is a function of the
number of district court and court of appeals judges passing on these cases.

Non-

uniformity, in turn, leads to difficulties in administration of the program at the agency
level. A specialized court could create uniform substantive norms that would be more
easily communicated throughout the SSA system.
97

This recommendation was not unanimous. Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) dissented and three other
members issued a counter proposal which would substitute a Benefits Review Board of the Appeals
Council, maintain district court review, but limit court of appeals review to questions of law. Id. at 58-59.
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COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT , submitted
to the President and the Congress pursuant to Pub. L. No. 105-119, (Dec. 18, 1998) p.74.
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Finally, proponents argue that the vast majority of these cases, involve only
factual issues. It is inefficient to require a generalist Article III judge to attempt to
evaluate medical and other evidence to determine if the administrative decision is
supported by substantial evidence.

It is far better, proponents argue, to have

decisionmaking in an administrative forum that would obtain experience and expertise in
the evaluation of the disability program. 99
A. Caseload Concerns
The 1990 Federal Courts Study Committee stressed the effect of SSA disability
claims appeals on the courts. The Committee’s working papers mentioned that such
appeals constituted a significant portion of the district courts’ workload—ranging from
5.3 percent to 11 percent from 1983 to 1988, and 3.0 percent to 4.2 percent of the court of
appeals caseload. 100 Equally persuasive to the Committee was that complaints received
from federal judges “were virtually unanimous in mentioning Social Security cases.
Judges apparently find these cases burdensome, but feel that their efforts contribute little
to improving administration in this area.”101
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See, e.g., A RNER, supra note 89 at 110-125 (arguing for the creation of an Article III Social Security
Court).
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See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990) (Vol.
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opined that additional specialized courts would be desirable as opposed to 80 who said it would be
undesirable. However, when respondents were asked “if you favor more specialized courts, what areas
would be most appropriate (check all that apply)?” the responses were Social Security (64), Tax (45),
Administrative (30) and Other (16). Id. (Vol. II) (“Survey of Circuit Judges”) (unpaginated). No similar
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It seems clear that, as Professor Levy concluded, “the substantial judicial
resources allocated to disability determinations are not used in a cost-effective
manner.”102 He points out:
Instrumentally, the added layers of judicial review might correct some of
the random good faith errors that inevitably slip through the complex
disability determination process. On the other hand, judicial review is
illsuited to perform this corrective function. Judges have no partic ular
expertise concerning the technical medical and vocational judgments
necessary to determine disability. Even the legal questions involved in
disability determinations are usually highly technical issues on which
courts normally defer to agency expertise. 103

Moreover, “[g]iven the recurring backlogs and delays in the administrative disability
determination process, securing judicial relief from an erroneous benefit decision is a
time consuming process at best, and many meritorious appeals may be lost to
attrition.”104
Chief Judge Pierce Lively of the Sixth Circuit in a 1986 interview summarized
this view of the social security appeals process from the perspective of the federal bench:
When you examine carefully what is involved in the Social Security
appeal, it becomes clear, to me at least, that we are not using our judicial
resources very wisely. . . . There is no new hearing after the administrative
law judge’s action. The magistrate makes a recommendation, and the
district judge is required to review that same administrative record de
novo before either accepting or rejecting the magistrate’s
recommendations. This is all done on cross-motions for summary
judgment. If the answer is still “no benefits,” the claimant may appeal to
the court of appeals fo r his or her circuit. Three judges are then required
to read the administrative record, and in some cases hear oral argument.
In most cases, the only question from the time the proceedings end in the
Social Security Administration is whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. All of the judges are merely reviewing factual
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Levy, supra note 10, at 508.

103

Id. (footnotes omitted).

104

Id.
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matters, and a very large portion of each record consists of medical records.
It seems to me that a special court could quickly acquire some expertise in
this field. I don’t denigrate the importance of Social Security cases to the
litigants; like all cases they are the most impotant [sic] thing in the world
to the parties involved. But I do think the claimants would get much faster
answers in a special court than they now do, being required to take their
turn on the crowded district court and courts of appeals dockets. 105
Today, there are even more reasons to believe the disability caseload will
continue to increase. As noted at the outset, the aging of the baby boom generation will
likely produce an upsurge of applications and disputes. 106 Moreover, SSA has recently
resumed its program of continuing disability reviews of existing beneficiaries, after
Congress authorized $4.3 billion for this purpose for FY 1996 to FY 2002.107 CDRs
tripled from about 600,000 in 1997 to 1.8 million in 2000. 108 Because CDRs can lead to
a termination of benefits in some cases, an upsurge in hearing requests, and, eventually, a
higher tide of appeals to the federal courts might be expected, as happened with a similar
policy in the 1980s. 109 On the other hand, the impact of CDRs on the judicial caseload
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One critic of Social Security Court proposals in the 1980s stated that:
In the 1983 fiscal year, the [SSA] Office of Hearings and Appeals received over 134,000
requests for hearings in Continuing Disability Review (CDR) cases, accounting for 36.4
percent of the requests received. The SSA’s own reinstatement statistics bear witness to
an unconscionably high rate of wrongful terminations during the period. By March 1984,
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Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security? A Critique of Recent Proposals, 15 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 1, 7-8 (1987) (footnotes omitted). It is no coincidence that filings in federal district court peaked at
27,500 in FY 1984, then dropped to 20,000 in FY 1985, and to just over 10,000 in FY 1986, after the CDR
program was terminated.

28

will be a function of the number of actual terminations that result from the review
process, and it is doubtful that the SSA would permit terminations to reach the levels that
occurred in the 1980s. 110
But whatever the cause, it is clear that district court filings in social security cases
are on the upswing again—13,059 in FY 1999 111 and over 15,000 in FY 2000. 112 The
number of new disability cases filed in the federal courts nearly tripled between 1990 and
2000.113
B. Uniformity Concerns
Proponents of a Social Security Court also focus on the problem of inconsistent
application of the law, both vertically within the different levels of the disability
adjudication system, and horizontally in different regions and judicial districts. The
concerns are voiced, for example by the National Association of Disability Examiners
(“NADE”), a professional organization, many of whose members are employed in the
state Disability Determination Service (“DDS”) offices and are directly involved in
processing claims for Social Security disability benefits. In Congressional testimony, the
NADE President summarized her concerns about the lack of uniformity:
Disability decisions are not made in a nationally uniform and consistent
manner. While to some extent this has always been true, it has become
increasingly more pronounced in recent years. For several reasons, we are
concerned that this trend will continue. New policies developed by SSA,
both in response to, and independent of, court decisions and other
litigation, have required that increasingly more weight be given to the
subjective complaints of disability applicants. Similar impairments will
110

See discussion at note 10 and accompanying text concerning the reasons why SSA’s independent status
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affect different individuals in different ways. Assessing these subjective
complaints necessarily has added to the growing belief that there is a
general lack of consistency in what the public believes should be a
uniform national program.
Social Security lacks a clear and uniform quality review process that
would provide consistent, meaningful feedback to all decision-makers.
Quality assurance reviews and the “adjudicative climate” under which
claims are reviewed, are inconsistent and reflective of—and convoluted by
–politics and/or litigation. Regulations are frequently promulgated and
implemented before operating procedures, instructions and other tools
have been developed. Decisions made by Administrative Law Judges are
driven by court decisions while decisions made in the DDSs are controlled
by program directives issued by SSA. . . .
***
In order to increase the consistency and uniformity of disability decisions,
the Social Security Administration must become truly “one SSA”. . . . . 114
NADE has made numerous recommendations concerning SSA administration, but
the organization also comes down squarely in favor of a new court:
NADE has long supported the establishment of a Social Security Court.
The development of—and decision on—an individual’s claim should not
be dependent upon their residence or judicial jurisdiction. The everincreasing complexity of disability claims, and the growth of medical
technology, makes the need for a specialized court, with expertise in these
matters, a necessity. 115
In addition, Frederick Arner has emphasized that uniformity is a basis for
preferring a Social Security Court, although be ultimately favored such a court under
Article III rather than Article I. 116
V. Opponents’ Arguments Against a Social Security Court
Led by claimant representatives and senior citizen organizations, opponents
counter with various arguments. They claim that the impact of social security cases on
114
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the federal court backlog is overstated. They argue that the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts weights these cases at approximately one- fourth the level of an average case
and that many are, for practical purposes, decided by magistrate judges. They also claim
that SSA’s policies of nonacquiescence, dilatory requests for remands, and other policies
are responsible for the high caseloads and that it would be improper to “reward” SSA for
these activities by creating a Social Security Court (“SSC”). This assumes that an SSC
would be more partial to SSA than current district courts, which is hard to predict. But it
may not be a bad assumption given that district courts have been remanding or reversing
SSA denials in over 50 percent of the appeals, 117 notwithstanding that the scope of review
is not de novo but is based on the supposedly deferential “substantial evidence” test. The
opponents have argued that it is this reversal rate that is the real motivation for moving
cases out of the district courts and that the nonuniformity is not that great among districts
or circuits. 118 On the other hand, independent Article I courts may be no less demanding.
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims produces at least partially favorable results for
claimants in 46 percent of its cases, 119 and this is after a administrative process that is
supposed to resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the veteran.
A related argument is that the SSC will become a rubber stamp for SSA. The
concern is that such a court will be faced with low staffing, high caseloads, and an
inevitable monotony or redundancy in the cases, and, thus, will become jaded and
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eventually act as the SSA Appeals Council purportedly does now—routinely dismissing
appeals.
The rest of opponents’ arguments boil down to the benefits of generalist judges,
even assuming the widespread use of magistrate judges to decide most of these cases
now; the need to modify the administrative procedures of SSA before tinkering with
judicial review; the unfairness of giving social security claimants “second class justice;”
and specific deficiencies of the SSC proposals, such as the lessened independence of
Article I judges, the lack of availability of class-action procedures or injunctive relief,
and the cost of traveling to the hearings.
Opponents also counter the uniformity argument, not by questioning its goals, but
by arguing that the nonuniformity is overstated.

Professor Rains argued that the

Congress and the Supreme Court can redress these problems. 120 Moreover he argues that
the problem has largely been caused by the SSA.
Nonuniformity exists largely between the SSA and the circuits rather than
among the circuits themselves. The reality is that SSA objects to
relatively uniform adverse decisions largely brought about in recent years
by the SSA’s obstinance, or . . . its lawlessness.
The cry of nonuniformity is a smokescreen. One can only suspect that the
administration favors the establishment of the Social Security Court in the
hope that such a court would abandon settled precedent and create new
precedent more favorable to the Social Security Administration. 121

As can be seen from the above quotation, there is also a political subcurrent to all
this, reflecting the hopes and fears surrounding the appointment process for the new
court. This reflects the concerns that a President will suddenly have the opportunity to
120
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court to follow established precedent unless extraordinary reasons for departing from it are given.
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appoint the entire initial membership of the new court. 122

A more subtle concern

transcends concerns relating to a particular President. It relates to agency “capture”—
that the nomination process might be influenced by groups (or DOJ itself) which also
would have similar influence in the selection of the SSA Commissioner and therefore the
SSA Court might be staffed with judges who share the same policy views as the SSA
Commissioner, thus making it more pro-agency.
As Professor Revesz has written:
For example, under a scheme of specialized courts, the Justice Department
can strive for a perfect identity between the views of a nominee to a
hypothetical Court of Social Security Appeals and those of the Social
Security Administration. If, in contrast, the responsibility for judicial
review of this agency’s decisions remains in the generalist courts, the
Justice Department would have to consider whether a nominee that is
desirable from the perspective of the Social Security Administration is
also desirable from the standpoint of, say, the Department’s own interest
in the enforcement of federal criminal law. It is unlikely that any
individual would be ideal from all perspectives.
Of course, the influence of the Justice Department is likely to be the
strongest, and the biasing effect most pronounced, where the Department
faces a weak private bar, as is true, for example, in Social Security cases.
There, the bar is unlikely to provide strong counter-weight to the
Department’s interest in securing sympathetic judges on the specialized
court. In contrast, where the Department faces a strong private bar, the
effect will be considerably mitigated, and may in fact pull in the opposite
direction as a result of the group’s capture of the nomination process. 123

Professor Revesz has also acknowledged the concern that the judges on the SSC
would have an overly narrow perspective:
[S]pecialized judges tend to come from relatively narrow segments of the
profession and are therefore less likely than generalist judges to have been
122
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exposed to a wide range of legal issues. Moreover, because they do not
adjudicate cases outside their area of specialization, they are also unlikely
to broaden their outlook once on the bench. Thus, in general, specialized
judges will be less skilled than their generalist counterparts at applying
concepts from other areas of law, even if the relevant reference points
were brought to their attention.
This problem may well be exacerbated by the bar that can be expected to
form around a specialized court. Experience with specialized courts
suggests that such courts will develop idiosyncratic procedures. When a
court’s procedures are not common to those of other courts, the high cost
of becoming familiar with such procedures provides serious disincentives
for lawyers to practice before the specialized court only occasionally.
Thus, lawyers who practice before specialized courts will be less likely
than those who practice before generalist courts to work daily with a broad
cross-section of federal law. 124

But he qualified his opposition to specialized courts where decisions of
such courts are reviewable by the generalist courts of appeals.
However, the negative effects of specialized courts identified in this
Article do not apply if the courts are subject to review, as of right, by the
generalist, regional circuits. Then, the specialized court would be
overseen by a forum that does not exhibit the systemic biases that are
likely to be found in specialized courts; that is functionally well suited and
capable of drawing insights from other areas of law, thereby promoting the
coherence of federal law; and that is capable of engaging in dialogue
designed to improve the quality of legal rules.
Thus, the negative effects discussed in this Article do not apply to . . . the
Tax Court, OSHRC, and [the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission] (FMSHRC)]. Similarly, the negative effects would not
apply to the proposed Social Security Court, as long as its decisions were
subject to review as of right in the regional circuits. 125
124
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VI. Key Statistics
In general, about two million claimants apply for disability annually.
Approximately 400,000 are granted benefits at the state DDS initial intake level and
another 75,000 on reconsideration. 126

Those who continue with their appeals then

proceed to the ALJ phase.
A. ALJ Hearing Stage
The SSA adjudication system is probably the largest system of trial-type
adjudication in the world. In FY 1999, the Office of Hearings and Appeals (“OHA”)
reported 524,644 case filings. In FY 2000, the number dropped by 3 percent to 507,010.
This compares to a dramatically lower figure in 1969 of 27,000. ALJ dispositions have
exceeded filings in recent years, with 596,999 in FY 1999 and 584,546 in FY 2000.
However, the pending caseload remains quite high, with 239,370 at the end of FY
2000.127
Cases decided by ALJs reverse claim denials by the State DDS offices at a
remarkably high rate. Favorable ALJ decisions to claimants were 66 percent in 2000, and
were over 70 percent from 1990-95. But variations by state ranged from 86 percent
(Maine) to 35 percent (DC). 128

This reversal rate is especially high in Disability

126

See SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION M AKING, supra note 26, at 86 (Chart 67) (reproduced in Appendix B
of this Report, infra).
127

These figures are from SOC. SEC. A DMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, A NNUAL STATISTICAL
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Insurance cases, in which claimants receive favorable decisions in over 75 percent of
cases; in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) cases, the figure is just over 50 percent. 129
The percentage of DI and SSI claimants represented by attorneys at ALJ hearings
has nearly doubled (to 70 percent) since 1977 and representation by non-attorneys has
gone from about 10 percent to 18 percent. Only about 12 percent of all claimants are
unrepresented. 130
The average processing time in FY 2000 at the ALJ stage was 274 days, down
from a peak of 386 days in 1997. 131
B. Appeals Council
Appeals Council receipts have fluctuated at slightly over 100,000: 110,159 in FY
1998; 115,150 in FY 1999; and 100,950 in FY 2000. As with the hearing level, the
Appeals Council has been able to increase its disposition rate with 101,877 dispositions
in FY 1998; 91,173 in FY 1999; and 134,191 in FY 2000. Pending cases at the Appeals
went from 120,548 at the end of FY 1998 to 144,525 at the end of FY 1999, to 113,323 at
the end of FY 2000. 132
Not all of the cases the Appeals Council receives are requests for review from
claimants, however. In FY 2000, for example, the dispositions listed above represented
106,358 requests for review; 9,813 court remands; 14,363 reviews of new court cases;
and 5,360 quality assurance and special reviews. 133

129

Id. at 22.

130

Id. at 73.

131

Id. at 81.

132

See SOC. SEC. ADMIN ., SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN , ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT , 117, Table
2.F11 (2000).
133

See SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION M AKING, supra note 26, at 76.

36

In 2000, about 76 percent of the Appeals Council decisions were denials of
review.

About 19 percent were remands (60 percent of which ultimately result in

allowances), and a small percentage were allowances or dismissals. 134
Requests to the Appeals Council to review ALJ decisions increased 54 percent
between 1994 and 2000, and average processing time more tha n quadrupled from
approximately 115 days to 505 days. 135
C. Courts
1. District court filings
Challenges to SSA decisions in federal district court rose steadily in the 1980s
and then dropped significantly in the 1990s, only to begin rising steadily again in the last
few years. In FY 1980, there were 7,814 SSA cases filed in the federal district courts.
By FY 1984, the high water mark, the total had reached 27,903. This large number has
been attributed to the aggressive “continuing disability review” (“CDR”) policy and nonacquiescence policies pursued by SSA from 1981-84.136

By FY 1990, with the

termination of the CDR policies, the caseload had quieted down to approximately 5,600.
It then see-sawed from approximately 12,000 in FY 1993 to approximately 8,500 in FY
1996. At that point, SSA began a program of increased CDRs again 137 and the caseload
began to rise fairly steadily again starting in 1997. 138 According to the Administrative
Office for the U.S. Courts, in the one-year period ending September 30, 1997, the total
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number of SSA cases commenced in the district court was 13,605. 139 In the next year,
the number jumped to 14,552, 140 then dropped slightly to 13,920 141 but then, in the most
recent reported one-year period (ending September 30, 2000), it rose to its highest level
since the 1980s—15,829. 142 In 2000, fifteen district courts reported over 300 cases. 143
The Eastern District of Kentucky led the way with 831.
In FY 2000, the district courts remanded 48 percent of the cases and reversed
another 6.15 percent outright.

About 60 percent of remands eventually become

allowances. 144 The average processing time at the federal district court stage is about 18
months. 145
These statistics are not uniform throughout the district courts. The data shows
that district courts have widely different approaches to disability appeals. Looking at
districts with over 100 cases in FY 2000, there were two districts (N.D.N.Y. and N.D.
Tex.) that did not grant a single allowance for disability claimants. At the other end of
the scale, W.D.Ark. granted 24.62 percent and S.D.N.Y. granted 27.87 percent of
claimants an allowance. 146

The federal district court average allowance rate is 6.15
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percent. The actual allowance rate for claimants after an appeal to the federal courts is
higher than 6.15 percent since 48 percent of cases are remanded and 60 percent of such
cases result in grants by the Appeals Council. This means that approximately 28.8
percent of appeals to the district courts result in an allowance after remand (3,904 of
13,681 cases). When added to the 6.15 percent allowance rate, this ultimately results in
awards for about 35 percent of claimants who appeal Appeals Council denials to district
courts. (Of course, the remanded cases would experience a delayed payment compared
to those directly awarded an allowance by the district court.)
There are no data on the remand rate per district, but one might assume that such
variations in the allowance rate would imply that the remand rate would display similar
variations. 147 It is thus hard not to conclude that disability cases receive non- uniform
treatment among districts.
2. Court of appeals filings
Statistics on SSA cases in the courts of appeals are harder to find. Total appeals
from district courts to courts of appeals in SSA cases were 699 in FY 1997; 862 in FY
1998, 904 in FY 1999; and 845 in FY 2000. 148 This last figure represents about 2.5
percent of the total appeals of civil cases lodged in the courts of appeals. In FY 2000,
there were 942 SSA cases terminated in the cour ts of appeals, including 726

to compile these figures is provided free on the Internet by Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin M.
Clermont of Cornell University Law School. See Eisenberg & Clermont, supra note 47.
147

See infra, Appendix A.

148

Data is from Table B-1A, contained in ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, A NNUAL REP . OF THE DIR.,
JUDICIAL
BUSINESS
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
COURTS
1997-2000,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html. This compares with 151 cases appealed from the CAVC
to the CAFC in the year ending March 31, 2001, see A DMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTIC [SIC], Table B-8 (Mar. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2001/tables/b08mar01.pdf. See also Levy, supra, note 10 at 480,
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determinations on the merits. Of these, only 175 required oral argument, the rest were
decided after submission of briefs only. 149 No data is available on reversal rates or time
frames for review at the court of appeals stage.
VII. Veterans Benefits Appeals Process
The process for judicial review for veterans’ disability benefits claims dates back
only to 1988. 150 Before that no judicial review was available. It is instructive to describe
the post-1988 process in some detail, because the process now involves an administrative
adjudication of benefits claims, followed by review by an Article I court, with review of
legal issues by the Article III Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
A. Basic Review Structure
A claimant veteran first submits an application for benefits. If the claimant is
dissatisfied with the benefits determination by the rating board that initially decides the
claim, there are three main appeals levels: (1) review by the Board of Veteran’s Appeals
(“BVA”); (2) review by the Article I U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(“CAVC”);151 and (3) review by the Article III Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“CAFC”) on questions of law only. Of course, certiorari review by the U.S. Supreme
Court is available but there has only been one case accepted by the Court since 1988. 152
It is also possible for the veteran to refile the claim. 153

providing a table of filings in the courts of appeals from 1965 to 1988. Until 1976, the number never
exceeded 300. The high water mark was 1,204 in 1984. By 1988, the number had dropped to 992.
149

See
JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2000,
supra
note
26,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/appendices /b01asep00.pdf.
150

Table

B-1A,

available

at

See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, §301, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113 (1988).

151

The court was named the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals (COVA) until March 1, 1999. See CAVC,
A BOUT THE COURT , available at http://www.vetapp.uscourts.gov/AboutCourt/CourtFacts.asp.
152

Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) (affirming CAVC and Federal Circuit decisions holding that the
VA incorrectly required a fault requirement as a condition of VA disability payments when a veteran’s
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1. The initial filing
When a veteran initially files a Compensation or Pension disability (“C&P”)
claim, the Veterans Benefits Administration (“VBA”) makes the initial decision
regarding claims. The VBA is divided into 58 regional offices 154 and has a staff of
12,008.155 The VBA makes decisions regarding 37 separate C&P programs. 156
Once a claim comes into the office, the VBA must gather pertinent information.
This may include a C&P medical examination. 157 For many, but not all, C&P programs,
the veteran must show that the disability occurred as a result of wartime military
service. 158 If so, the VBA must pull the veteran’s service and prior medical records. The
records may come from the Veterans Health Administration, Department of Defense, the
National Personnel Record Center (“NPRC”), VBA Records Management Center, or
private medical or income records. 159

This process is hampered for older veterans’

non-war related injury was exaggerated during surgery at a VA hospital). The Supreme Court is granted
appellate jurisdiction over VA disability cases from the Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1254.
153

Gary O’Connor, Rendering to Caesar: A Response to Professor O’Reilly, 53 A DMIN. L. RE V. 343, 35355 (2001).
154

Documents reviewed list both 57 and 58 offices.

155

VA CLAIMS PROCESSING TASK FORCE , REP . TO THE SECRETARY OF VETERANS A FFAIRS 22-23 (Oct.
2001) [hereinafter VA TASK FORCE ] (displaying a graph showing that the work force was at a high of
13,714 in 1993 and decreased slowly to 11,250 in 1998-99 and then slightly increasing to 12,008 in 2001).
156

Id. at 8-9. The VBA work is not limited solely to the 37 C&P programs.

157

The VBA is currently running pilot programs of outsourcing this C&P medical evaluations from the
VHA to private doctors. See id. at 20-21.
158

Active duty injuries that result in a disability are filed as a compensation disability and the program has
2.3 million beneficiaries. The 364,000 pension disability recipients are low-income veterans who received
a serious disability after service. See VBA, WHAT ARE THE STEPS IN PROCESSING M Y CLAIM?, at
http://www.vba.va.gov/ro/west/phenx/claims.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2000).
159

Id. at 47-50
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claims, because a 1973 fire at the NPRC in St. Louis destroyed eighty percent of Army
records from before 1960 and a large portion of other records. 160
After collecting the data, the VBA uses up to five dozen separate factors in
“rating cases.”161 The average processing time varies on a monthly basis; in November
2000 the processing time was 158.7 days and in July 2001 it was 184.2 days 162 while the
average time for FY 1999 was 205 days. 163 The VBA’s website states that the time from
initial filing to a final Regional Office decision is four to ten months depending on the
complexity of the case and the retrieval of records. 164 Cases are “rated” “to reflect a loss
of earnings capacity.”165 Unlike the “all or nothing” approach of the social security
program, the ratings are scaled in 10 percent increments from 0 to 100 percent. 166 In
2001, a 10 percent rating would pay $101 per month while a 100 percent rating would
pay $2,107 per month. 167

No data from the VBA, BVA, VA, or other sources has

revealed the number or percent of cases ending favorably for claimants at the initial
Regional Office level. The statistic is apparently not kept. This may be partially due to
the fact that even cases resulting in a payment to the veteran may be appealed if the
veteran is dissatisfied with the rating.
160

Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Fact Sheet: Facts About the 1973 St. Louis Fire and Lost Records (Oct. 27,
1999), available at http://www.va.gov/pressrel/99stlou.htm.
161

Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Fact Sheet: VA Disability Compensation Claims Processing, May 2001, at
http://www.va.org/pressrel/claimpro.htm.
162

VA TASK FORCE , supra note 152, at 1-2.

163

Statement of Rick Surratt, Deputy National Legislative Director, Disabled American Veterans, Before
the Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, U.S. House of Rep., May 18,
2000 [hereinafter Surratt DAV Testimony 2000], at http://www.dav.org/voters/testimony_claims_
20000518_print.html.
164

See VBA, W HAT ARE THE STEPS IN PROCESSING M Y CLAIM?, supra note 155.

165

Fact Sheet, supra note 157.

166

Id.

167

Id.
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The initial stage takes a veteran seven months (205 days) on average from filing
to notification of the decision. 168 The VA’s goal is 74 days. 169 The delays are primarily
due to data retrieval delays and the volume of cases that need to be reworked after
remand from the BVA or CAVC. One potential benefit of the lengthening of the initial
process 170 may be greater accuracy at the Regional Office level. Remands from the BVA
have dropped from 50 percent in the early 1990s to 29.9 percent. 171
2. The Board of Veterans Appeals
Veterans may appeal decisions to the Board of Veterans Appeals. The BVA is an
appellate body within the VA, established in 1933, and consists of over sixty members,
appointed by the President upon the recommendations of the Secretary. 172 Currently all
members of the BVA are attorneys. 173 Since 1992, decisions are made by individual
members and not by panels. 174 As noted above, a large number of cases that come before
the court are remanded back to the VBA regional offices. There are two main reasons for

168

Id.

169

Id.

170

See Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, A UDIT REP . #5D2-B01-013, (Mar. 15, 1995)
(discussing the lengthening of the processing time from 106 days in 1988 to 212 days in 1995; and
mentioning the 50 percent remand rate in 1995).
171

Surratt, DAV Testimony 2000, supra note 160 (describing a 50 percent remand rate from the BVA to
Regional Offices in 1992); VA TASK FORCE , supra note 152, at 35. In 1997, the BVA remanded 45.2
percent of cases. See id. at 35.
172

See REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS (FY 2000) 2-3 (noting that BVA was
created by Exec. Order 6230, and now has 67 authorized positions).
173

In the past, a mix of attorneys and physicians sat on the BVA. See FOX, supra note 9, at 18 (2000)
(citing Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, United States Senate, Veterans Administration Board of Veterans’
Appeals 40th Anniversary 1, 3 (1973))
174

See Gary O’Connor, Did Decide or Should Have Decided: Issue Exhaustion and the Veterans Benefits
Appeals Process, 49 A M. U. L. REV. 1279, 1284-85 (2000).
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the volume of remands: (1) the open case file system, and (2) insufficient C&P medical
examinations (33 percent of all remands). 175
The open case file is part of the VA’s pro-claimant stance that Congress intended.
This allows the veteran to add new information or evidence at anytime prior to a final
VBA decision. The entire VBA structure is designed to be non-adversarial and lawyers
are prohibited in the Regional Office process. Although lawyers are allowed at the BVA
level, few oral arguments are held and only 6.3 percent of claimants are represented by
attorneys. 176 The open case file allows the veteran to prepare a more favorable file after
an initial undesirable rating. However, when new evidence is added to the file, the BVA
must typically remand the case for the Regional Office to consider. Commentators have
suggested the need for either a closed case system177 or an optional de novo review at the
Regional Office before the veteran appeals to the BVA. 178 A closed case system would
likely eliminate the non-adversarial atmosphere because of the necessity to prepare the
record “litigation” before the BVA. The preferable answer may be true de novo review
by the BVA—meaning that the BVA would decide a case when new evidence was
submitted instead of remanding the case to the Regional Office. 179

175

See VA TASK FORCE , supra note 152, at 20.

176

See REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN , supra note 169 at 6. This is an increase from 5.1 percent the previous
year. Interestingly, BVA statistics show that, in FY 2000, claimants represented by attorneys did not
achieve a higher rate of allowances than those represented by VSOs, but they did receive a significantly
higher rate of remands. Unrepresented claimants did markedly worse on both counts. See id at 34.
177

See A UDIT REPORT , supra note 167, at 6-7 (calling for BVA and CAVC to review evidence as it existed
when the initial decision was reached).
178

See VA TASK FORCE supra note 152, at 15.

179

Cf. FOX, supra note 9, at 84 (recommending that the BVA be allowed to “build a proper hearing record
without the need to remand the case to the regional office.”)
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BVA response time in FY 2000 was 220 days, up from 197 in FY 98 but
markedly improved from a peak of 781 days at the end of FY 94. 180
3. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“CAVC”)
Only the claimant, and not the VA, may appeal a BVA decision to the CAVC.181
This makes logical sense, as the BVA is part of the VA and makes decisions in the shoes
of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
The CAVC is a seven- member court no minated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate for fifteen-year terms. 182 BVA decisions are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard. 183 Initial decisions are made by a single judge, although a veteran
can move for panel review by three judges or en banc review after the initial court
decision. 184 Only panel or en banc decisions have precedential value.
The addition of the CAVC (originally called Court of Veterans Appeals) marked a
sea change to the veterans claims process, which until its creation in 1988 did not include
any judicial review. Its record, however, has proved to be a mixed one. 185 On the one
hand, judicial oversight was brought to the system for the first time. On the other,

180

See REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN, supra note 169 at 5. “Response time” is defined as “the number of days
it would take BVA to render decisions on all pending certified appeals at the processing rate of the
immediately proceeding one-year time frame.” Id. at 36. The BVA attributes this improvement to its
making more use of videoconference hearings, as authorized by Congress in the Board of Veterans’
Appeals Administrative Procedures Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-271. Id. at 6.
181

38 U.S.C. § 7252.

182

Congress has recently authorized two additional judges to serve during the period January 1, 2002,
through August 15, 2005. See the Veterans Education and Benefits Expansion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
107-103 § 603 (Dec. 27. 2001).
183

38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4); Hensley v. West , 212 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

184

U.S. Vet. App. R. 35(c). See O’Connor, supra note 150, at350-51.

185

Compare James O’Reilly, Burying Caesar, 53 A DMIN . L. REV. 223 (2001) (arguing CAVC, in effect,
duplicates BVA, adds delays without efficiency benefits, and is a failed experiment because both BVA and
CAVC are “captured” by the veteran community) with O’Connor, supra note 150, at 350-51 (rebutting
many of O’Reilly’s criticisms).
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however, the addition of the adversarial appeal to the court layered on top of a nonadversarial system that has not been modified to take account of the new appeals system,
has led to longer processing times at all levels of the system (see below). In a sense, it
raises the recurring question of comparing the values of accuracy versus timeliness.
Even though the CAVC process is an adversarial one, the court allows oral
arguments in only 1 percent of the cases. The file is closed and the CAVC only reviews
evidence based on the record at the time of the final BVA decision. 186 The CAVC
reviews law de novo and facts under the clearly erroneous standard. 187
The caseload 188 has fluctuated quite widely in the past seven years. New cases
have ranged from 1,279 in 1995 to 2,442 in 2000 (the average is 2,090). Dismissals and
affirmances have averaged about 54 percent of all terminations. Partial affirmances
average about 12-15 percent of all terminations. Unfortunately the court’s annual reports
lumps together reversals/vacations/remands, making it impossible to parse the remaining
third of the terminations—and critics have claimed that too many of these are remands. 189
The time frame for CAVC decisionmaking, from filing to disposition has
averaged around one year for the last seven years. 190
4. Limited review by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”)
Either the VA or the claimant may appeal CAVC decisions to the Court of
Appeals for the CAFC. 191

186

See Gary O’Connor, supra note 171, at 1292-93.

187

38 U.S.C. § 7261.

188

The statistics are from U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT , A NNUAL REPORTS, ABOUT THE
COURT , available at http://www.vetapp.gov/AboutCourt/AnnualReport.asp.
189
190

See O’Reilly, supra note 182, at 228-29.
See id.

46

Under the veterans judicial review statute, the CAFC only has jurisdiction of
appeals from the CAVC that raise legal, as opposed to factual, issues, i.e., constitutional,
or statutory issues or a challenge to a regulation that has been applied to the case. The
rate of appeals to the CAFC, is, not surprisingly, quite low (only 194 filings in 1999
(compared to 2,442 in CAVC), and there is a high rate of jurisdictional dismissals as
well. The CAFC only reversed nineteen decisions of the CAVC in 1999 (though the
number of remands is not known). Its jurisdiction is so limited and it hears such a
miniscule percent of claims that the court’s role is discussed very little in reports by
interest groups or the VA Claims Processing Task Force.
5. Refiling
Once a decision is final, the veteran still has two options that are not available to
SSA benefit claimants: (1) reopening a claim and/or (2) requesting a revision. As will be
discussed below in the statistics section, a majority of C&P filings are not new matters.
Indeed, a veteran can reopen a claim as many times as s/he wishes if “new and material
evidence” can be provided. Nor is there a time limit on reopening a claim. If the veteran
submits new evidence, the agency is required to take another look at the former claim. 192
This removes almost all issue- and claim-preclusion effects of a VA decision.
Revisions (akin to a request for reconsideration) have no time limit, but can only
be requested once per claim. A revision can only be granted if a “clear and unmistakable
error” is found in a prior decision.
B. Delays in the Process

191

38 U.S.C. § 7292.

192

See O’Connor supra note 150, at 352-53.
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The average time from the date the claimant files a Notice of Disagreement until
the case is made final by the VBA—including final decisions by the regional office on
remand or later decision by the BVA—was 650 days in 2001 according to the VA’s FY
2001 budget report. The VA Claims Processing Task Force estimates the average time at
796 days. When cases are remanded to the VBA Regional Office, they are then placed
back in the system to be processed along with initial filings.193
The delays at the BVA level appear to be the greatest problem with the VA
appeals structure. In addition to the fact that there are too many remands, delays after the
remand are caused by the failure of VBA Regional Offices to give remands priority.
C. Representation
Claimants may be represented by an attorney or a representative from a Veteran
Service Organization. Under the VA appeals system, claimants and their attorneys or
representatives must meet a complex set of requirements. 194

Attorneys and

representatives may only collect a fee for representation if: (1) the Notice of
Disagreement was filed after Nov. 18, 1988; (2) the BVA has already issued a decision
regarding the issues; and (3) the attorney-client relationship began at least one year after
the BVA decision. 195

This, of course, makes it harder to attract lawyers as

representatives. Thus, even during the BVA appeals stage, only 5 percent of veterans
have legal counsel.

193

However, an additional 84 percent have a Veteran Service

See id. at 27-29. O’Reilly cites a figure of 745 days, supra note 182, at 226.

194

See NAT ’L ORG. OF VETERANS’ ADVOCATES, WHY A VETERAN SHOULD BE REPRESENTED, available at
http://www.vetadvocates.com/why_choose.htm.
195

FOX, supra note 9, at 40 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (1994)).
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Organization (“VSO”) representative. 196 Once the case goes to the CAVC, however, the
fee payment limitations are removed, (although the fees charged are still reviewable for
reasonableness and may not exceed 20 percent of the past-due benefits awarded 197 ), and
the rate of attorney representation increases significantly. At the CAVC level, 45 percent
have an attorney when they file their appeal with the CAVC and 71 percent have an
attorney by the end of the CAVC process. 198
VSO representatives are provided free to veterans by Veteran Service
Organizations. However, in the past, many such representatives lacked the ability to
gather evidence for a case. Since 1999, over one thousand VSORs have been trained in
the data retrieval process and can request data to quicken the case filing preparation. 199
The VA is attempting to increase the involvement of VSO representatives while the
CAVC is attempting to increase the involvement of attorneys. 200
D. Statistics
The following statistics are from FY 1999. Although more recent data exists for
several levels of the review process, this is the most recent year for VBA filings. 201

196

Until 1988, a long-standing fee limitation of $10 per case was imposed by statute. The Supreme Court
upheld this limitation against a due process challenge in Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473
U.S. 305, 323 (1985) (Rehnquist J.) (describing the process as one of “rational paternalism.”) Veteran
service organizations (VSOs) supported this attorney fee limitation because they argued that attorneys
would transform a paternalistic system into an adversarial system. They also benefited from the system
because it essentially gave them a monopoly over representation—because veterans could not hire
attorneys, they joined VSOs for their pro bono representation. The current attorney’s fee payment rules
have a similar effect.
197

38 U.S.C. §§ 5904(c)(2) and (d)(1).

198

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT , A NNUAL REPORTS, ABOUT THE COURT , available
at http://www.vetapp.gov/AboutCourt/AnnualReport.asp.
199

See VA TASK FORCE , supra note 152, at 59-60.

200

Compare id. at 26-27, 59-60; with O’Connor supra note 150, at 355-57.

201

It should be noted that no statistics are available for the number or percent of initial filing decisions that
award payment to the veteran. The VBA does provide statistics for new C&P benefit recipients. In 1999,
133,906 veterans began receiving C&P benefits. However, of the more than two million filings per year,
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Table of 1999 statistics:

the VBA does not report the number of filings for a change in benefits versus the number of first time
filings. Moreover, an approved claim awarded in 1999 might not have been filed in 1999, so one cannot
simply divide the number of filings in 1999 by the number of allowances in that year.
202

See Surratt DAV Testimony 2000, supra note 160, at 7.

203

This figure includes the over 27,000 remands from the BVA. See id. at 7-8.

204

See VA TASK FORCE , supra note 152, at 35.

205

See CAVC, A NNUAL REPORTS (providing data for FY 1999 ending on Sept. 30), at
http://www.vetapp.uscourts.gov/AboutCourt/AnnualReport.asp.
206

This figure is for “reversed/vacated & remanded” for FY 1999. It does not include partial
reversals/remands. It compares to 2256 “merits terminations as a whole.” It does not match the 1,380
remands reported by the VA Claims Processing Task Force in table S-7.1 at page 35. Moreover, these
figure are the remands ordered in 1999 and not the number of remands ordered from the cases filed with the
CAVC during 1999. Some of the remand cases date from 1993, as described in Table S-1.4 on page 30 of
the VA TASK FORCE REPORT , supra note 152.
207

See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT , APPEALS FILED, TERMINATED , AND PENDING
DURING THE 12-M ONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1999, at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep99.pdf.
Updated figures for appeals from CAVC for the period ending March 31, 2001 are: Pending April 1,
2000—158; Filed—151; Terminations by Judges —176; Terminations other—57; percent reversed 22
percent, pending March 31, 2001—76. See A DMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL

50

E. Lessons Learned from the Veterans Benefits Appeals Process.
The main criticisms of the VA appeals process concern the slowness of the
administrative process and the penchant of both the BVA and the CAVC to remand cases
back to the rating boards. This leads to lengthy delays in the remanded cases because
they are not placed at the beginning of the queue. One explanation for this tendency is
the inadequacy of the administrative record caused by the informality of the rating board
process and the lack of representation at that level. 208 Additionally, many C&P programs
require the claimant to prove that the disability occurred as a result of combat. The added
research and paperwork requests from other government agencies causes delay in the VA
system that would not concern the SSA if the SSA Court were to be established. 209
Critics of the CAVC have also accused it of taking the easy way out and remanding cases
on one issue when another issue raised would have resolved the case in the claimant’s
favor.
Most critics calling for VA disability appeals reform have concentrated on
reforming the current system.

There is a narrow range of reforms that is typically

discussed. The VA Claims Processing Task Force proposed that the BVA not have
remand authority. Instead, BVA would retain jurisdiction while the record was reworked

CASELOAD STATISTIC [SIC], Table B-8, (Mar. 31, 2001) available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/caseload2001/tables/b08mar01.pdf.
208

See Gary O’Connor, supra note 150, at 363 (stating BVA “does not have a neat, organized record”) and
id at 383 (stating in perhaps the vast majority of remanded cases, “there is not enough evidence in the
record at the time of a CAVC appeal for the court to grant benefits”).
209

On average, the VBA waits 53 days for a Service Verification and 83 days for Service Medical Records
and a total of 123 days for information from the NPRC in St. Louis. See VA TASK FORCE , supra note 152,
at 22, 54. To compound the problem of remands for insufficient evidence, remanded cases are not given
priority for record retrieval. Id. at 48.
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and completed. 210

Professor Fox also favors a BVA centered reform (and the VA

Claims Processing Task Force’s proposal). He recommends that the reconsideration
before a Hearing Officer at the VBA be eliminated, and instead, the case should go
directly to the BVA. To complete this change, Fox asserts that the BVA members should
be turned into ALJs as in the SSA system. 211 Professor Sidney Shapiro and Ronald Smith
of the Disabled American Veterans, concur with Fox on turning the BVA into ALJs.
However, they focus their attention on the CAVC. They argue that the system would be
streamlined if the CAVC wo uld resolve all possible allegations of error before
remanding, thus reducing the need for a future appeal. Additionally, they would like the
CAVC to enforce deadlines on remanded cases to force the BVA and the Regional
Offices to reduce inordinate time delays. 212 The most vocal critic of the VA disability
structure is Professor O’Reilly. He argues that the CAVC and the BVA are duplicative
and wasteful, instead, he would like to adopt the SSA system of review by generalist
Article III judges. 213
These issues are, to some extent, a product of the difference between the
underlying informal administrative process at the VA and that at SSA. At the SSA, the
more formal ALJ process and the more prevalent participation of attorneys (in 70 percent
of cases) produce a better record. However, the CAVC does move about 50 percent
faster than the district courts do in SSA cases—with terminations completed in twelve
months as compared to up to eighteen months for the district courts.
210

VA TASK FORCE , supra note 152, at 34-37.

211

FOX, supra note 9, at 82-84.

212

Sidney Shapiro & Ronald Smith, Veterans Judicial Review: Is There a Need for Reform? (preliminary
draft presented to the ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice Feb. 1, 2002).
213

See O’Reilly, supra note 182.
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If a Social Security Court were to be established, the lessons from the CAVC
would be highly relevant. Our discussions with attorneys and other critics of the VA
disability process (including representatives of the Disabled American Veterans) reveals
that, while they believe the system has flaws, it is fixable; and they do not favor moving
to the SSA-district court review process. 214

VIII. An International Comparison—The Australian Social Security Appeals Tribunal
Numerous countries around the world use a social security tribunal of some kind
to decide disability claims. 215

Most of these are the equivalent to the SSA ALJ

adjudication. Australia’s Social Security Appeals Tribunal, however, is a review tribunal
that is closer to an Article I SSA Court.
Australia has a national Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”) that hears
appeals from most administrative agencies, with further review of legal questions
available in the regular federal courts. But Australia has also created a specialized
national Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“SSAT”) (along with several others including
a Veterans Review Board, Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Review Tribunal). 216
Unlike the other three, the SSAT functions as a first-tier tribunal with second-tier review
in the AAT. The SSAT’s caseload is actually larger than that of the AAT. In 1996-97,
13,817 applications for review were filed with the SSAT, and 6,849 with the AAT. In
214

Interview with Ronald L. Smith, Chief Appellate Counsel, Disabled American Veterans and Barton L.
Stichman, Joint Executive Director, National Veterans Legal Services Program, at ABA Midyear Program,
“Veterans Judicial Review: Is There a Need for Reform,” (Feb. 1, 2002).
215

See e.g., Daniel L. Skoler & Ilene R. Zeitzer, Social Security Appeals Systems: A Nine-Nation Review,
INT ’L SOC. SEC. REV. Vol. 1, p. 57 (1982).
216

This description is taken from A USTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM ’N, REVIEW OF THE ADVERSARIAL
SYSTEM OF LITIGATION, FEDERAL TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS, paper 24, chs. 4, 11 (1998) available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/issues/24/ALRCIP24.html.
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addition, the SSAT has 277 members (including two full time Senior Members, 38
executive members, 97 community and welfare members, 97 legal members, and 42
medical members) as compared to 100 members for the AAT.

The SSAT usually

operates with three- member panels. The agency may “take back” and alter a decision,
without having to wait for the outcome of the SSAT proceedings. The SSAT may, but
need not, adjourn its proceedings while the agency reconsiders its decision. The SSAT
has the power to affirm, vary or set aside decisions. Where it sets aside a decision it may
either substitute a new decision or send the matter back to the agency for reconsideration
in accordance with directions or recommendations of the tribunal.
Cases in the SSAT are decided on submissions, written and oral by the applicant,
written submission by the Department and, if required, the results of inquirie s made by
the SSAT. Oral evidence through witnesses is not usually required. While applications
may be decided on the papers or by telephone hearings, most applications are decided
through a hearing attended by the applicant. In 1996–97, 86 percent of cases were
decided by a hearing (as opposed to those withdrawn or dismissed without a hearing).
The SSAT assists applicants to attend hearings by reimbursing reasonable travel
expenses, conducts hearings out of its city locations and provides interpreters at no cost
to the applicant. The SSAT also provides an informal hearing in which the parties are not
generally represented, although the applicant and other parties (but not the respondent
agency) may be represented at hearings. Representation is usually by advocates from
welfare rights and community legal centers.
The SSAT has set various performance standards for the time taken from
registration to finalization of applications. For example, one indicator used is that 75
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percent of appointments for a hearing should be scheduled within 42 days of the SSAT
receiving the relevant Department’s notice of reasons for a decision. 217

The SSAT

typically conducts a hearing and makes a decision within an hour. In 1996-97, 89.6
percent of decisions were made on the day of hearing. The overall processing time at the
SSAT was less than fifteen weeks in over 60 percent of the cases.
One discordant note was sounded about the ability of the SSAT to convene in
rural areas in Australia. A witness in rural Geelong, Victoria testified:

[I have been asked] to pass on to you . . . [the] many problems with the
Social Security Appeals Tribunal being unable to reach rural people.
Apparently it is supposed to come to rural areas, including Geelong, but in
reality it takes about six months to get a hearing date.
Obviously when people are appealing a decision about social security, that
potentially imposes a lot of financial hardship on them. It is a particular
problem in hearings about medical matters because in those cases there
needs to be a doctor on the hearing panel and apparently it is almost
impossible to get a doctor to come to Geelong or other rural areas. Many
of those clients have almost no income, so it is very difficult for them to
go to Melbourne. Again, I am told that in some cases like that they will
try to provide phone hearings, but that is ineffective for many people
because it is just not a way they feel they can communicate. 218
IX. Options and Models for Change
A. Administrative Changes—With No Changes Above the Appeals Council Level
One option, of course would be to limit changes in the system to the administrative
level. Many such proposals have been detailed earlier in this Report.
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SSAT Annual Report 1996–97, 24–26 cited in id.
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Testimony of Mr. A. Willis, Principal Solicitor, Before the Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into legal
services in rural Victoria, Geelong, (June 29, 2000), available at http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au
/lawreform/Legal_Services_Inquiry/Community%20Legal%20Services%20-%20Moorst%20Willis%20&
%20Stokie.htm.
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B. Split Enforcement Model
Under this model, 219 the SSA would be “split” into a rulemaking/initial
decisionmaking body on the one hand, and an adjudicatory agency (presumably with two
tiers), on the other. This model would require adversary hearings with both claimants
and SSA represented in the adjudicatory body. No change would necessarily be required
in judicial review, although other such models provide for judicial review directly in the
courts of appeals. Would the caseload go down due to more satisfactory decisions at
agency level? Would the SSA itself appeal many decisions?
1. Social Security Review Commission (“SSRC”). The archetypal application of this
model would involve the creation of an agency staffed with Commissioners and ALJs
(and possibly an Intermediate Appeal Board a la the Appeals Council, to keep the
need for Commissioners to a manageable level). SSA would still make rules and
administer the intake and initial determinations. The SSRC would be to SSA as the
independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission is to OSHA.
2. United States Office of Hearings and Appeals (“USOHA”). A variation, proposed by
SSA’s Association of ALJs, would create a quasi- independent adjudicative entity
within SSA, headed by a Chief Judge and Deputy Chief Judge appointed by the
President. Initial decisions by ALJs would be appealable to an Appellate Panel,
composed of ALJs in regional office appointed by Chief Judge for a set term
(modeled on Bankruptcy Court Appellate Panel).

Existing ALJs would be

grandfathered in.
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For discussions of this model see George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some
Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 A DMIN. L. REV. 315, 315 (1987) and Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: The Case for a Split-Enforcement Model of Agency
Adjudication, 4 A DMIN. L.J. A M. U. 389 (1991).
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C. Article I Social Security Court (“SSC”)
1. 95th Congress H. R. 8276 (1977) (Rep. James A. Burke). Would create an Article I
court for appeals from SSA decisions relating to the factual issue of disability.
2. 97th Congress H.R. 3865, H.R. 5700 (1981) (Rep. J. J. Pickle). Would create a
Review Board composed of GS-16 civil servants220 who have had previous
experience as ALJs to review ALJ decisions, with review by an Article I Social
Security Court with 20 Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed (“PA-SC”) judges,
having ten- year terms to handle appeals in SSA disability cases. Judicial review
would be exclusively in Court of Appeals for DC Circuit, but limited to review on
constitutional questions and questions of law only.
3. 99th Congress, H.R. 4419 (1986) (Title II). (Rep. William Archer). The “Social
Security Procedural Improvements Act of 1986”221 would replace the Appeals
Council and district court review with a SSC, with 20 PA-SC judges, including a
Chief Judge selected by the President, having ten-year terms, removable only for
specified cause after opportunity for a hearing. The Chief Judge may also appoint
“commissioners” to assist the judges. To provide uniformity, the bill provides that
the decision of one judge becomes that of the court in 30 days, but within this period,
the Chief Judge may order review by a three-judge panel. All decisions determined
to be precedential by the Chief Judge are to be published. Judges may be removed by
the President for cause. Judicial review is exclusively in the Court of Appeals for
Federal Circuit (“CAFC”).

220

Note that this level of civil servants has now been largely supplanted by the Senior Executive Service.

221

Discussed in Rains, supra note 110, at 16-17.
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4.

99th Congress, H.R. 4647 (1986) (Rep. Tom Tauke).

The “Social Security

Reorganization Act of 1986”222 would recreate SSA as an independent agency, with
the ALJs remaining in the Department of HHS. A non-adversarial proceeding is held
before a “hearing officer,” with an appeal to an ALJ available on the record of the
hearing. Appeals from ALJ decisions could be taken by either party to a SSC. The
SSC portion of the bill is similar to H.R 4419, except that the district courts would
retain jurisdiction over claims raising constitutional issues or the legality of
regulations.
5. 100th Congress H.R. 2117 (1987) (Rep. Archer); H.R. 1666 (1997) (Rep. Tauke)
Similar to earlier bills introduced by the same Members.
6. 101st Congress H.R. 2349 (1989) (Title II) (Rep. Archer). Similar.
7. 102nd Congress H.R. 2159 (1991) (Title II). (Rep. Archer). Similar.
8. 103rd Congress H.R. 3487 (1993) (Title II). (Rep. Archer). Similar.
No similar post-1993 legislation has been found. A staff member of the House Social
Security Subcommittee reported that no such legislation had been introduced in the past
few years. 223
9. Draft DOJ bill. 224 This draft proposal, circulated in 1985-86, would create an
Article I SSC consisting of five regional divisions (Northeastern, Midwestern,
Midatlantic, Southeastern and Western, with principal offices in each division—NYC,
Chicago, Washington, Atlanta, SF, and Dallas).

222

The court would have 37 judges,

Id. at 17-19.
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Telephone interview with Jeffrey Eckert, Staff Assistant, House Subcommittee on Social Security,
January 2002.
224

Attached to memo, dated May 13, 1985, on file with authors. The proposal is also discussed in Rains,
supra note 110, at 1-3 (1987).
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including a chief judge, five division chief judges and six associate judges in each
division. The judges would serve nine- year terms (staggered to start). Judicial review
would be in the CAFC (at the discretion of the CAFC, except that if the Secretary
certifies that the case has “broad or significant implications in the administration or
interpretation of the social security laws,” the CAFC must hear the appeal). The SSC
would be administered by a Council made up of the Chief Judge, the division chief
judges and one associate judge from each division. The Council could sit as an en banc
review panel. [Note—there is no evidence that this bill was ever introduced. 225 ]
10. Similar SSC model, but with judicial review in geographical circuits. In 1987,
Antonin Scalia suggested certiorari review of Social Security Court decisions by courts
of appeals. 226
D. Article I Disability Court.
Proposed by the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements (August
1984). This resolution, which was never submitted to the House of Delegates, called for
creation of an Article I court to hear appeals from SSA, VA, and other agencies.
Professors Levy227 and Bruff228 have also suggested such a court that would have
jurisdiction over SSA and VA appeals.
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It was critiqued in Rains, id., and according to Arner, supra note 89, at 123, it was shelved after a
negative editorial by the New York Times, a letter of opposition to the New York Times from House
Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino, and a resolution of opposition from the ABA.
226

Remarks Before the Fellow of the American Bar Foundation and the National Conference of Bar
Presidents 9-10 (Feb. 15, 1987), cited in Revesz, supra note 55, at 1137.
227

Levy, supra note 10, at 533 (suggesting the veterans court be transformed into a Court of Disability
Appeals).
228

Bruff, supra, note 55, at 363.
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E. Article III Social Security Court.
An Article III version of the court proposed by Representative Archer was
suggested by the Sloan Foundation Report in 1989. 229

While the report did not

specifically describe the details of the SSC, it would, of course, have life-tenured judges
instead of judges with 10-year terms. 230
F. Article III Specialized Court of Appeals.
1. Jacobs bill H.R. 3265, 103rd Cong. (1993). This bill would consolidate review of all
district court decisions in SSA cases in a new Article III United States Court of Appeals
for the Social Security Circuit, located in Washington. 231
2. Jacobs bill H.R. 1587, 104th Cong. (1995). Similar.

X. Summary of Analysis and Recommendations
A. Pros and Cons of the Present Review System and Alternatives
1. The present system
a. The arguments favoring the present system
i) It has been in place for a long time and people rely on it.
ii) It is the most independent tribunal possible—Article III district judges give the
review system a legitimizing effect.
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Arner, supra note 89, at 117. The Report points out one tactical reason for the earlier proposals for an
Article I Social Security Court modeled on the Tax Court—it would remain under the oversight of the
House Committee then overseeing Social Security—the powerful House Ways and Means. On other hand,
a new Article III court would come within the purview of the Judiciary Committee and it may be that the
Judiciary Committee will assume jurisdiction of the Social Security Court as it has over the Tax Court.
230

A possible drawback of making it an Article III court, noted by Arner, would be the ensuing
complication in combining it with the Article I veterans court—especially since many of the representatives
appearing before the latter court are not attorneys.
231

Hearings were held on this bill by the House Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Ways and
Means Committee on October 21, 1993, but no further action was taken.
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iii) It provides a venue in every judicial district and circuit, which

makes it more

convenient for claimants.
iv) The courts of appeals can review district courts and set national standards.
b. The arguments against the present system
i) It is non-uniform in its decisionmaking and procedures with no assurance that
the individual district judges provide decisions that are any more accurate than
those of ALJs.
ii) District court decisions have little precedential value.
iii) It is expensive and time consuming:
Social security disability cases comprise 5.86 percent of the federal district
court docket in FY 2000.
District courts take eighteen months on average to process a social
security disability appeal.
iv) Magistrate judges do much of the actual work, so Article III independence and
legitimation is overstated.
2. An Article I court structure with review in the courts of appeals on questions of law
and questions arising under the Constitution
a. Arguments in favor of the proposal
i) Uniformity of outcomes is enhanced.
ii)

ALJs can be better utilized (i.e., feed-back loops between the court and
individual ALJs can be created).

iii) Timelier decisionmaking.
iv) Reduced burden on the federal court system.
b. Arguments against the proposal
i) Independence of an “independent agency” plus an Article I court is still less
then that of an Article III court.
ii) Potential loss of geographical convenience
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iii) Would create a larger bureaucracy, unless the Appeals Council is eliminated.
3. An Article III specialized Court of Appeals for Social Security Circuit with review
jurisdiction over district court action in social security cases.
a. Arguments in favor of the proposal
i) Systematic oversight of district courts.
ii) Allows for more expert determinations in order to build a system of precedent
binding on the agency.
b. Arguments against the proposal
i) Geographically limited, unlike Circuit Courts
ii) Does not really reduce burden on judicial system.
iii) Limited docket may make it harder to find high quality judges.
B. Our Recommendations
The case for an Article I disability court presents a fascinating question. On the
one hand, the present system has the virtue of familiarity; on the other hand, it can
certainly be improved. On balance, we think that a shift to an Article I review structure
does not just replace one set of problems with another, but would produce real
improvements in the system of administrative justice. In drawing this conclusion, we
view the CAVC experience with VA disability cases as instructive, but not determinative.
Still, the presence of this alternative system, which though imperfect appears workable,
makes similar reforms to the social security program seem more workable as well. In our
view, SSA has many internal strengths that can make its adoption of a new review
structure even more beneficial to all concerned than the record of success produced by
the VA disability appeals process.
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Under the current district court review structure, caseloads will increase
inexorably and magistrate judges can be expected to determine an increasing percentage
of disability cases. The main argument against relieving the district courts of this
decision burden is their Article III independence. We believe there are ways to counter
this concern within the context of SSA and Article I courts. 232
With the new status of SSA as an independent agency, there is less of a risk of
political control of administrative decisions. 233

The issue of political control was

especially sensitive due to the experience during the Reagan administration’s operation of
the Continuing Disability Review program, which drove many deserving claimants off
the SSA rolls. Although CDRs are now being undertaken on a large number, there is no
evidence of the massive terminations that undermined the credibility of that process
twenty years ago.
Moreover, as the ABA has recognized, 234 the independence of SSA also extends
to its administrative deciders, the ALJ corps, over 1000 strong. This is an objective
source decisionmaking that is lacking at the VA (where non-legally-trained rating boards
make initial decisions) and it can be integrated more effectively into an Article I review
structure. While more study is needed, the proposal of a two-tier ALJ decision process
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We put aside any constitutional challenges to this Article I court, for several reasons: first, such a court
deals with “public rights” matters, and second, legal and constitutional issues can still be heard in Article
III courts. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1986) (delegation of
even common law counterclaims to an Article I court does not violate Article III); see also Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (defining public rights).
233

To further defuse worries about Presidential control of the Social Security Court, members could be
required to be appointed like commissioners of independent agencies, with one political party limited to a
bare majority.
234

In 1986, the ABA gave an award to the Social Security ALJs for upholding the integrity of
administrative adjudication. See Charles Bono, Administrative Report, JUDGES' J., Winter 1992, at 23, 41.
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might facilitate error correction, since statistically it can be shown that three (or even
two) judges tend to make more accurate decisions than one alone. 235
There is, of course, a question whether the ALJ level (even with two tiers) should
become the agency’s final level of review. The Commissioner may be reluctant to
completely give up control over the decision process. Yet, in terms of decision resources,
it seems that the Appeals Council is no longer a necessary or even cost-justified step. As
noted above, in 1987, after the Administrative Conference conducted a major study of the
Appeals Council, 236 it reported that:
Serious consideration was given to recommending outright abolition of the
Appeals Council. This view was premised on the Appeals Council’s
present inability to do little more than add one more layer to the alreadylengthy review bureaucracy. (This criticism was not intended as a
denigration of Appeals Council members, whom the study found to be
competent, dedicated, and cooperative.) Before recommending such a
drastic, and irreversible step, however, the Conference felt that an attempt
should be made to use the unique perspective and expertise of the Appeals
Council to help correct the existing problem. The Conference believes
that fundamental changes are needed to reduce the Council’s caseload to a
more manageable volume, so that ind ividual cases can be given more
attention and the Council can be a significant contributor to agency
policymaking. Accordingly, to implement a system-reform function for
the Appeals Council, the Conference makes [a series of]
Recommendations for modification of its structure, purpose and
operations. 237
The Conference then formally concluded: “If the reconstituted Appeals Council
does not result in improved policy development or case-handling performance within a
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See M ASHAW ET AL , supra note 15, at 26-27.
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The study was published as Charles H. Koch and David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A
Study of the Operations of the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST . L. REV. 199
(1990).
237

Administrative Conference of the U.S., A New Role for the Social Security Appeals Council,
Recommendation 87-7 ¶2, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305877.html. See text
at note 16, supra.
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certain number of years (to be determined by Congress and SSA), serious consideration
should be given to abolishing it.”238
In the intervening time, it appears that the Appeals Council’s caseload has not
been reduced and its policy making function has not been enhanced. Therefore, it may be
time to consider the reforms suggested herein—moving to a Social Security Court and
allowing a reconstituted ALJ stage to be the final “bite at the apple” at SSA.
The proposal for a SSC, drafted by the Department of Justice in 1985-86 (see Part
IX(A)(9), above), provided for a court of 37 members that had offices in five regions
around the country. This number still seems about right. The Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims provides a basis for comparison. It has seven judges (temporarily raised
to nine). In 1999, it received 2,442 filings, and there were 14,881 affirmances of denied
claims by the BVA in that same year. The SSA Appeals Council, in FY 2000, made
about 97,000 decisions that were unfavorable to claimants. This is about 6.5 times as
many potentia l appeals to the SSC as compared to the CAVC. A similar ratio would be
derived by comparing the 15,829 SSA appeals in the district courts in FY 2000 to the
2,442 filings in the CAVC in 1999. Based on these comparisons, the number of judges
on an SSC should be around 45. 239
These figures reflect the much higher percentage (59 percent) of rulings that are
favorable to claimants (reversals and remands) at the BVA as compared to 29 percent at
the Appeals Council. But if a two-tier ALJ process were made the final arbiter at SSA
instead of the Appeals Council, changes in the SSC’s potential caseload could ensue as

238

Id., preamble.

239

The SSC could decide cases in a two-tier (precedential/non-precedential; one judge/three judge) system
as the CAVC and the bankruptcy courts do.
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well. On the one hand, it might lead to a more modulated level of claimant appeals if
they were allowed two levels of review before independent ALJs. 240 On the other, SSA
might be given the right to seek review by the SSC as well.
Regardless of the size of the SSC, the DOJ proposal for geographically distributed
regional offices makes sense to address the important issue of access to the courthouse.
We also believe that appeals from the SSC should be to the geographic circuits,
(like the Tax Court) in order to preserve some diversity on questions of law. However,
judicial review to the courts of appeals should be limited to legal issues—the validity or
interpretations of statutes or regulations and constitutional issues. Article III court
appellate jurisdiction of these issues is essential, for constitutional reasons and for
developing precedent and important legal questions.

On the other hand, fact-based

review in the court of appeals is of limited value in terms of good faith error
correction. 241 Class actions and facial constitutional challenges could be preserved in
district courts, with direct rule challenges going directly to the courts of appeals.
If, as we recommend, SSA should be entitled to appeal from initial ALJ decisions
to the SSC, this change would lead to true adversarial hearings before ALJs with the
government being represented.
Finally, making the SSA court an Article I rather than Article III court has two
further advantages: it would not be necessary to create more life-tenured judges; and it

240

As Professor Levy acknowledges in connection with his proposal, “[t]he extent to which independent
administrative review will screen out cases in difficult to predict. It will depend to some degree on the faith
which claimants have in the objectivity of administrative decisions.” Levy, supra note 10 at 514, n. 294.
241

See id., at 514-515 (arguing for limited review in the court of appeals). Professor Levy recommends
centralizing appellate review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. We prefer to retain
jurisdiction in the geographic circuits. Professor Levy carefully addresses the constitutionality of limiting
fact-based review to the Article I court at 517-525.
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would also make it easier, ultimately, to combine the SSA court with the CAVC should
it be decided in the future to create an overarching Disability Court.
In conclusion, although we do not favor the proposed Article III specialized court
of appeals, we do favor serious consideration of an Article I Social Security Court.
C. Next Steps
Whatever happens with the judicial review proposal, we believe several steps can
and should be taken at the SSA level. First, the use of attorneys for the government
requires further consideration (costs, qualifications, etc.). 242

Second, consideration

should be given to the long pending suggestion of closing the file at the ALJ stage.
Third, amending the “good cause” remand provision of section 205(g) should also be
considered (so as to reduce the ease of remand at the district court).
Finally, we believe much can be done to better utilize and improve the
performance of ALJs in the disability decision process, separate from the Article I court
idea. An ALJ appeals process (using two or three ALJs to review their colleagues’
decisions in precedential or other selected cases)243 could aid uniformity and correctness,
and, if it works well, could take over the error correction and quality review functions
now performed by the Appeals Council. The resources currently spent on the Appeals
Council (reportedly over $64 million in FY 2000)244 could be used to cover the additional

242

This would presumably also lead to coverage by the Equal Access to Justice Act, concerning payment of
attorney fees, because the cases would then fit the definition of “adversary adjudication” under the Act.
See Statement by Stanford G. Ross, Chairman, Social Security Advisory Board, at the Tenth National
Educational Conference Association of Administrative Law Judges (Oct. 3, 2001) available at
http://www.ssab.gov/rossstatemtaljconf.pdf; see also SSAB, CHARTING THE FUTURE , supra note 21, at 1920 (calling for the SSA to be represented at ALJ hearings because the claimants are represented).
243

Selection of ALJs to serve on the reviewing panels could be made by the regional chief ALJs at the
SSA.
244

REPORT ON NEW INDEPENDENT REGULATORY A GENCY , supra note 10, at 4 (citing the SSA Fiscal Year
2000 Performance and Accountability Report’s figure of $64,671,200).
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ALJs needed for the two tier review. Additionally, some Appeals Council members
might be considered for positions as ALJs or as members of the Social Security Court.
Moreover the SSA should use some of these resources to improve its policymaking
through rulemaking.
It is beyond the scope of this Report to assess the current effectiveness of SSA’s
rulemaking, but we believe that many of the Appeals Council’s resources could be
profitably redeployed to this effort.
We are prepared to assist in exploring these and other initiatives and alternatives,
if called upon by the SSAB.
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Appendix A.
Allowance rates by district for the 48 district courts with at least 100 SSA appeals
ordered by their allowance rates. 245

District

Number
of cases
terminated

Percentage of
judgments on
the merits won
by claimant

Number of
judgments on
the merits

Number of
judgments for
the claimants

Allowance
Rate246

NYND

104

13

0.0

0

0

TXND

170

24

0.0

0

0

KYED

727

132

2.3

3

0.41

KYWD

176

48

2.1

1

0.57

OKND

169

39

2.6

1

0.59

LAWD

148

14

7.1

1

0.68

LAED

118

19

5.3

1

0.85

OHND

437

62

6.5

4

0.92

CAND

188

48

4.2

2

1.06

PAED

283

57

5.3

3

1.06

VAWD

369

88

5.7

5

1.36

MIWD

131

34

5.9

2

1.53

NM

183

21

14.3

3

1.64

PR

167

35

8.6

3

1.80

TXED

158

10

30.0

3

1.90

ALMD

103

7

28.6

2

1.94

NJ

293

20

30.0

6

2.05

TNED

305

84

8.3

7

2.30

WVSD

298

149

4.7

7

2.35

INSD

116

41

7.3

3

2.59

CACD

605

160

10.0

16

2.64

TXSD

164

54

9.3

5

3.05

NCMD

160

83

6.0

5

3.13

SC

363

78

19.2

15

4.13

TXWD

111

31

16.1

5

4.50

NYWD

131

31

19.4

6

4.58

MD

306

79

17.7

14

4.58

245

Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form: Federal District-Court
Civil Case, supra note 47 (providing a dataset that displays the total number of SSA appeals, the number of
cases
terminated
on
the
merits
and
the
plaintiff’s
win
rate),
at
http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questcv3.htm.
246

The allowance rate divides the number of judgments for the claimants (ordering payments without
remand) into the total number of cases terminated. Of course, the actual allowance rate after the district
court level will be higher because claimants are ultimately awarded benefits in the majority of remands.
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WAWD

147

15

46.7

7

4.76

FLSD

143

CASD

110

47

17

8

5.59

43

16.3

7

6.36

CAED

176

41

29.3

12

6.82

ILND

109

40

20

8

7.34

OHSD

311

121

19.8

24

7.72

MIED

275

186

12.4

23

8.36

MOWD

229

70

28.6

20

8.73

FLMD

639

137

41.6

57

8.92

PAWD

280

147

17

25

8.93

ALSD

157

42

38.1

16

10.19

OR

188

52

44.2

23

12.23

NYED

389

87

59.8

52

13.37

ARED

355

184

26.1

48

13.52

GAMD

194

107

29

31

15.98

GAND

269

108

50

54

20.07

ARWD

130

66

48.5

32

24.62

NYSD

305

158

53.8

85

27.87

OKED

110

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

OKWD

131

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

ALND

413

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

TOTAL
AVERAGE
247

13681

3849

21.85

841

6.15

150.3

44.24

21.85

9.66

6.15

247

The average number of cases terminated is given for all 91 district courts, and not just the ones
displayed in the table. The average for the number of judgments on the merits, the percentage of judgments
for the claimants, the number of judgments for the plaintiffs and the allowance rate are given for the 87
districts reporting these statistics. In addition to the three districts without data in the table, the district
court for Arizona does not submit statistics.
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Appendix B.

DI and SSI Disability
Determinations and Appeals*
Fiscal Year 2000

Initial Level
1,988,425

Allow
38%

Deny
62%

Allow
16%

Deny
84%

Allow
59%

Dismiss
12%

Deny
29%

Appeals Council
122,780 **

Allow
2%

Dismiss
2%

Remand
22%

Deny
74%

Federal Court
Decisions***
12,011

Allow
6%

Dismiss
6%

Remand
48%

Deny
39%

Reconsiderations
584,540

ALJ Dispositions
433,584

Total
Total
Initial Applications
Initial Applications
Reconsiderations
Reconsiderations
ALJs
ALJs
Appeals Council **
Appeals Council **
Federal Court ***
Federal Court ***

Number
Number Percent
Percent
1,106,344
100.0
1,106,344
100.0
759,191
68.6
759,191
68.6
90,805
8.2
90,805
8.2
253,615
22.9
253,615
22.9
1,999
0.2
1,999
0.2
734
0.1
734
0.1

* Data relate to workloads processed (but not necessarily received) in fiscal year 2000, i.e., the cases
processed at each adjudicative level may include cases received at 1 or more of the lower
adjudicative levels prior to fiscal year 2000. Not all denials are appealed to the next level of review.
** Includes ALJ decisions not appealed further by the claimant but reviewed by the Appeals Council on
“own motion” authority.
*** Remands to ALJs by the Appeals Council and Courts result in allowances in about 60 percent of the
cases.
Source: Social Security Advisory Board, Disability Decision Making: Data and Materials, January 2001.
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